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The Paradoxes of Defensive
Medicine
Michael J. Saks and Stephan Landsman†
Abstract
For decades, “defensive medicine” has been the leading
argument driving reforms of medical malpractice laws throughout
the United States. Defensive medicine is the presumed practice of
administering excessive tests and treatments as a stratagem for
reducing healthcare providers’ risk of malpractice liability,
despite the absence of any expected benefit for the patient. The
practice is widely believed to exist throughout American
healthcare as a response to fears of malpractice litigation, and
thought to be enormously wasteful of healthcare dollars. In
consequence, it has become a justification for law reforms
insulating the healthcare industry from tort liability. These
claims are promoted by the healthcare industry even though they
imply that most providers routinely engage in healthcare fraud
and violate their own ethical rules. We review the evidence behind
these beliefs—including direct physician surveys, clinical scenario
studies, and multivariate analyses of actual case data—and find
little support and numerous paradoxes. The validity vel non of
the defensive medicine narrative has implications for law and
legal policy, as well as healthcare economics and patient safety.

Contents
Abstract ..............................................................................25
Contents ..............................................................................25
Introduction .......................................................................26
I. A Contrivance for Advocacy? .................................27
A. Healthcare Expenditures and Revenues .....................27
B. Iatrogenic Injuries and Deaths...................................29
C. Making an Excellent Situation Better ........................34
II. Why Commit and Why Admit? .................................37
†

Michal J. Saks is Regents Professor, Sandra Day O’Connor College
of Law, Arizona State University. Stephan Landsman is the Robert
A. Clifford Professor Emeritus, College of Law, DePaul University.
The authors thank Sarah Pook for her research assistance.

25

Health Matrix·Volume 30·2020
The Paradoxes of Defensive Medicine
A. Why Engage in Defensive Medicine? ........................37
B. When is Defensive Medicine Actually Defensive? .....41
C. Why Would Anyone Admit to Engaging in Defensive
Medicine? .................................................................44
III. Does Defensive Medicine Actually Occur? .......49
A. Direct Physician Surveys ...........................................53
B. Clinical Scenario Surveys ..........................................59
C. Multivariate Statistical Analyses ...............................62
1. Studies and Their Findings: Cesarean Sections ... 65
2. Studies and Their Findings: Cardiac and Other
Medical Procedures .............................................66
3. One “Almost Quasi-Experiment” ......................... 73
Discussion.............................................................................75

Introduction
Risks of harm to patients present a broad array of problems
and possible solutions to the existing law and current healthcare
system.1 Aside from medical malpractice litigation itself, perhaps
nothing is as controversial as “defensive medicine.” Defensive
medicine is almost universally regarded as a dreadful problem: a
bane of the healthcare system, an evil committed by healthcare
providers, suffered by patients, paid for by all of society, and
blamed on the tort system.2 Its causes and consequences, as well
as its existence, are widely accepted with little question.3
In general terms, defensive medicine can be thought of as the
practice of ordering medically unnecessary tests and performing
needless procedures for purposes unrelated to the well-being of
patients. Rather, it is “employed explicitly for the purposes either
of averting a possible lawsuit or [if a lawsuit were filed] of
providing appropriate documentation that a wide range of tests

1.

See, generally, MICHAEL J. SAKS AND STEPHAN LANDSMAN, CLOSING
DEATH’S DOOR: LEGAL INNOVATIONS TO STEM THE EPIDEMIC OF
HEALTHCARE HARM (forthcoming).

2.

See, e.g., M. Sonal Sekhar & N. Vyas, Defensive Medicine: A Bane
to Healthcare, 3 ANNALS MED. HEALTH SCI. RES. 295, 296 (2013).

3.

See e.g., Laura D. Hermer and Howard Brody, Defensive Medicine,
Cost Containment, and Reform, 25 J. OF GEN. INTERNAL MED. 470,
470 (2010).
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and treatments has been used in the patient’s care.”4 One needn’t
be a medical expert to recognize this as a “deviation from sound
medical practice.”5
A generation ago, during a panel discussion about “public
discontent” with tort law, one participant asked, “[W]hat about
the problem of defensive medicine? The general counsel of a New
York hospital told me that from 15 percent to 25 percent of their
services are done solely to provide a possible defense in a
lawsuit.”6 In response, another panelist posed the naked emperor
question: “I would like to know where can we go for
documentation of defensive medicine? Where are the independent
studies that show us what defensive medicine really is—beyond a
catch phrase, what it means in reality, and how we can evaluate
it? Where can we go beyond the assertions of interested parties?”7
Indeed. How do we actually know anything about it? How
was the phenomenon of defensive medicine discovered? By whom?
What is the evidence for it, for its costs, that it even exists? Do
we have answers yet? How do we know that defensive medicine
is an economic and behavioral discovery, rather than a rhetorical
discovery?

I. A Contrivance for Advocacy?
A. Healthcare Expenditures and Revenues

That “defensive medicine” is a useful trope for healthcare
industry lobbyists can be readily understood. Beyond this, as will
be demonstrated, little else about defensive medicine is clear. The
4.

Laurence R. Tancredi & Jeremiah A. Barondess, The Problem of
Defensive Medicine, 200 SCI. 879, 879 (1978); Medicine, STEDMAN’S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY (28th ed. 2005) (“[D]iagnostic or therapeutic
measures conducted primarily as a safeguard against possible
malpractice liability”); Frank A. Sloan & John H. Shadle, Is There
Empirical Evidence for “Defensive Medicine”? A Reassessment, 28
J. HEALTH ECON. 481 (2009) (describing defensive medicine as care
for which expected cost exceeds expected benefit).

5.

David M. Studdert et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk
Specialist Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293
JAMA 2609, 2609 (2005).

6.

Richard Abel et al., Public Discontent: The Debate Goes Beyond
Tort Law; It’s About Lawyers, 81 ABA J. 70, 72 (1995) (quoting
Philip Howard).

7.

Id. (quoting Stephen Daniels).
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lobbyist’s goal is to bring about changes in law that advantage
the client industry by increasing its revenues or reducing its costs.
From that perspective, the chief problem with the medicalmalpractice system is that its direct economic cost is relatively
small. The total amount of malpractice insurance premiums
collected (from doctors, hospitals, and other providers) reflects
most of the costs required for the defense of any and all claims:
compensation payments, legal fees, profits for insurance
companies, administrative costs, and anything else.8 That total
represents one quarter of one percent of all expenditures on
healthcare; that is, $9.2 billion out of $3.5 trillion.9 Placed in the
context of liability insurance for all U.S. industries, that $9.2
billion constitutes only 2.4% of all the liability insurance
premiums paid for all activities in the U.S.10 At the same time,
the healthcare industry collects 17.9% of our nation’s GDP while
causing more serious accidental injuries and deaths than all other
human activity combined.11
8.

We say “most of the costs” because some very large healthcare
organizations, and some government facilities, self-insure; thus,
their liability expenditures are not reflected in the insurance data
we cite. See Understanding Medical Malpractice Insurance, INS.
INFO. INST., https://www.iii.org/article/understanding-medicalmalpractice-insurance [https://perma.cc/PY22-ZRF2] (last visited
Nov. 6, 2019) (“Medical professionals employed by federal agencies,
such as the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, do not need
malpractice coverage since the federal government self-insures
against liability claims. State and local governments in some
instances may also provide liability protection for medical
employees.”).

9.

Data from 2017; malpractice premiums from Best’s Rankings U.S.
Property/Casualty – 2018 Direct Premiums Written by Line, A.M.
BEST (June 18, 2019), http://www.ambest.com/review/display
chart.aspx?Record_Code=274410 [https://perma.cc/H2Q9-24RS]
[hereinafter Best’s Rankings]; healthcare expenditures from NHE
Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://
www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/statisticstrends-and-reports/nationalhealthexpenddata/nhe-fact-sheet.html
[https://perma.cc/3APU-HURR] (last updated Apr. 26, 2019).

10.

Best’s Rankings, supra note 9.

11.

LINDA T. KOHN ET AL., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER
HEALTH SYSTEM 26 (2000). The 17.9% figure comes from NHE Fact
Sheet, supra note 9. All else being equal, one might expect an
industry that constitutes 17.9% of the economic activity of society
to cause approximately 17.9% of the damage and pay
approximately 17.9% of the cost of those damages (by way of its
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Regarding cost, the U.S. healthcare industry charges more
(while delivering poorer outcomes) than its counterparts in other
modern nations.12 For example, “spending began soaring [after
1980] beyond that of other advanced nations, but without the
same benefits in life expectancy.”13 Americans now pay thousands
for the same services that cost hundreds to citizens of other
advanced societies. We spend more than twice as much per capita
than the average of all other modern nations, while our “health
system generally delivers worse health outcomes than any other
developed country.”14 According to Elisabeth Rosenthal, formerly
an emergency physician and currently editor-in-chief of Kaiser
Health News, “[i]n the past quarter century, the American
medical system has stopped focusing on health or even science.
Instead it attends more or less single-mindedly to its own
profits.”15 Reforms prompted by notions of defensive medicine are
part of that effort.
B. Iatrogenic Injuries and Deaths

Despite the enormous expenditures Americans make for
healthcare, preventable medical error and injury have emerged as
extremely serious problems in the United States. Though the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) does not make

liability insurance). Yet, according to the numbers, the healthcare
industry generates far more than its share of the damage—while
paying only a bit more than a tenth of its “share” of victim
reimbursement costs for those harms.
12.

See, e.g., ELIZABETH DOCTEUR & ROBERT A, BERENSON, HOW DOES
THE QUALITY OF U.S. HEALTH CARE COMPARE INTERNATIONALLY?
TIMELY ANALYSIS OF IMMEDIATE HEALTH POLICY ISSUES 10 (2009);
Irene Papanicolas et al., Health Care Spending in the United States
and Other High-Income Countries, 319 JAMA 1024, 1025 (2018);
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL & INST. OF MED., U.S. HEALTH IN INT’L
PERSPECTIVE: SHORTER LIVES, POORER HEALTH 91 (Steven H.
Woolf & Laudan Aron eds., 2013).

13.

Austin Frakt, Medical Mystery: Something Happened to U.S.
Health Spending After 1980, N. Y. TIMES (May 14, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/14/upshot/medical-mysteryhealth-spending-1980.html [https://perma.cc/VBM7-EEVY].

14.

ELISABETH ROSENTHAL, AN AMERICAN SICKNESS 3 (2017).

15.

Id. at 1.
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a point of separately counting deaths due to iatrogenic injuries16
in its monitoring of the “leading causes of death in the United
States,” if it did, annual deaths due to medical error by itself,
separate from other causes of accidental death, would rank third
after heart disease and cancer.17 Makary and Daniel, combining
major studies of several types,18 calculated “a mean rate of death
from medical error of 251,454 a year.”19 The patient chart reviews
employed in those studies resemble a net with holes large enough
for many actual instances of adverse events20 to slip through.
Studies using more intensive approaches found that the number
of serious injuries and deaths were fifteen-to-twenty times as great
as found using only chart reviews.21 Another technique, the Global
Trigger, found as many as ten times the number of adverse
events, and more than twice as many deaths, as the earlier records
reviews.22 Upon reviewing the four major Global Trigger studies
available, James concluded in 2013 that deaths from “preventable

16.

STEVEN PEGALIS, AMERICAN LAW MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 130 (3rd
ed. 2019) (“An iatrogenic injury is an injury produced in response
to the physician/health care provider’s therapeutic effort.”).

17.

See Martin Makary & Michael Daniel, Medical Error—The Third
Leading Cause of Death in the U.S., BMJ (May 2016).

18.

See, e.g., KOHN ET AL., supra note 11, at 1.

19.

Makary & Daniel, supra note 17.

20.

“Adverse event” is the prevailing term of art in patient-safety
research. An adverse event is defined as “an injury that was caused
by medical management (rather than the underlying disease) and
that prolonged the hospitalization, produced a disability at the
time of discharge, or both.” Troyen A. Brennan et al., Adverse
Events and Negligence in Hospitalized Patients, 324 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 370, 370 (1991).

21.

See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews et al., An Alternative Strategy for
Studying Adverse Events in Medical Care, 349 LANCET 309, 312-13
(1997); Lori Andrews, Studying Medical Error in Situ: Implications
for Malpractice Law and Policy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 357, 357, 36162 (2004); Knight Steel et al., Iatrogenic Illness on a General
Medical Service at a University Hospital, 304 NEW ENG. J. MED.
638 (1981).

22.

See David C. Classen et al., ‘Global Trigger Tool’ Shows that
Adverse Events in Hospitals May Be Ten Times Greater than
Previously Measured, 30 HEALTH AFF. 581, 584 (2011).
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adverse events” numbered somewhere between 210,000 and
440,000 per year.23
All of the above studies and reviews are limited to what
happens to inpatients in non-federal, acute-care hospitals. Beyond
those patients were others receiving diagnoses, treatments, and
surgery in various other hospital and non-hospital settings, such
as doctors’ offices, outpatient clinics, free-standing-surgical
centers, skilled-nursing facilities, rehabilitation hospitals, and
nursing homes. Regarding what happens in those settings, the
research is far more limited. But a few facts provide clues. First,
surgical visits occur as frequently—or perhaps more frequently—
in outpatient settings as in hospitals.24 Though surgeries in
hospitals would, in the aggregate, involve more serious and risky
conditions, the sheer number of surgeries that take place outside
of hospitals25 offers ample opportunity for preventable errors to
occur. Second, approximately 1.8% of patients in skilled-nursing
facilities died as a result of the care that they received, or needed
but did not receive, in such facilities.26 This would add
approximately 90,000 deaths to the total.27 Third, an IOM study
of medication-related injuries concluded that three times as many
harmful medication errors occur in healthcare delivered outside

23.

John T. James, A New, Evidence-based Estimate of Patient Harms
Associated with Hospital Care, 9 J. PATIENT SAFETY 122, 127
(2013).

24.

Karen A. Cullen et al., Ambulatory Surgery in the United States,
2006, NAT’L HEALTH STATS. REP. NO. 11, at 5 (Sept. 4, 2009),
available at https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr011.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2WPZ-B67Q]; See also, Judy Mathias, AHRQ
Releases Stats on Outpatient, Inpatient Surgeries, OR MANAGER
(June 2, 2017), https://www.ormanager.com/briefs/ahrq-releasesstats-on-outpatient-inpatient-surgeries/ [https://perma.cc/GB3ZH9QQ].

25.

NAT’L QUALITY FORUM, FINAL REPORT: NQF-ENDORSED MEASURES
FOR SURGICAL PROCEDURES, 2015–2017, at 5 (2017) (“In 2006, an
estimated 53.3 million surgical and nonsurgical procedures were
performed in U.S. ambulatory surgery centers, both hospital-based
and freestanding. In 2010, 51.4 million inpatient procedures were
performed in nonfederal hospitals in the United States.”).

26.

OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., OEI-06-11-00370, ADVERSE EVENTS IN
SKILLED NURSING FACILITIES: NATIONAL INCIDENCE AMONG
MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES, at 19 (2014).

27.

Id.
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of hospitals as inside them.28 Fourth, nearly as many payments
to compensate patients for iatrogenic harms were made for
injuries that incurred in outpatient settings as in hospitals, twothirds of which were for major injury or death.29 The leading type
of error in the outpatient setting is diagnostic.30 Medication errors
in the outpatient setting accounted for 1 out of 131 deaths
compared to only 1 out of 854 inpatient deaths.31 In light of these
facts, however incomplete, a conservative estimate would be that
as many preventable deaths and serious injuries occur in
healthcare settings outside of hospitals as occur inside of
hospitals.32
Finally, there is the problem of unnecessary care—subjecting
patients to surgeries, tests, scans, medications, and treatments
that offer patients no benefit while exposing them to risks of
harm. The vast majority of these unnecessary treatments would
not be captured by any of the studies designed to detect adverse
events. Even unnecessary surgery, in and of itself inherently
injurious, would be overlooked unless it resulted in an adverse
event. The line dividing beneficial from useless testing and
treatment is a difficult one to draw. But the work of the
Dartmouth Institute, and other researchers, has found that about
thirty percent of healthcare spending in the U.S. is worthless
because it offers patients no benefit.33 That implies that an
enormous quantity of harmful or risky tests and procedures have
gone uncounted by the usual studies of iatrogenic injury.34

28.

INST. OF MED., PREVENTING MEDICATION ERRORS (2006).

29.

Tara Bishop et al., Paid Malpractice Claims for Adverse Events in
Inpatient and Outpatient Settings, 305 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2427,
2429 (2011).

30.

Id. at 2427.

31.

Id. at 2430.

32.

Needless to say, all of those deaths and injuries create enormous
costs. See, e.g., John C. Goodman et al., The Social Cost of Adverse
Medical Events, And What We Can Do About It, 30 HEALTH AFF.
590, 590 (2011).

33.

Nicole Cafarella Lallemand, Reducing Waste in Health Care,
HEALTH AFF. (Dec. 13, 2012), available at https://www.
healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20121213.959735/full/
[https://perma.cc/C2D5-JD6C].

34.

See generally id.
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In an effort to stimulate some appreciation of what those
numbers mean, patient-safety experts have sometimes illustrated
the incidence of preventable deaths resulting from medical errors
in terms of jumbo-jet crashes.35 Why? Because sudden
concentrations of deaths attract the attention of the news media,
government officials, and the public, while people dying quietly,
one at a time, spread across the nation’s healthcare systems,
apparently are easy to overlook.36 By that more unsettling
measure, we could be seeing six or more jumbo jets crashing each
day, every day of every year. Even the very lowest estimates
would translate to one jumbo jet crashing approximately every
third day.
Donald Berwick, former administrator of the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) was quoted saying, “[i]n
almost no other field would consumers tolerate the frequency of
error that is common in medicine.”37 Mark Chassin, President and
CEO of the Joint Commission (formerly the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO)), made a
similar point:
If the performance of certain high-reliability industries,
whose standards of excellence we take for granted, suddenly
deteriorated to the level of most health care services, some
astounding results would occur. At a defect rate of 20
percent, which occurs in the use of antibiotics for colds, the
credit card industry would make daily mistakes on nine
35.

A Boeing 747-400 with a three-class layout can hold 416 passengers
plus crew. The first to use this analogy in the patient safety context
was Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851, 1851
(1994).

36.

For example, fear of terrorism within our borders has captivated
our media. We pay close attention to those risks and we invest
large sums to prevent that source of harm to our citizens. The
number of fatalities from terrorism, inside the U.S., from 2002
through 2016, however, was just 190 people. See ERIN MILLER &
MICHAEL JENSEN, FACT SHEET, AMERICAN DEATHS IN TERRORIST
ATTACKS, 1995–2016, NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF
TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO TERRORISM (Nov. 2017), available
at http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_AmericanTerrorism
Deaths_FactSheet_Nov2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/PG9W-7QLU
].

37.

Reed Abelson, In Bid for Better Care, Surgery with a Warranty,
N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/
17/business/17quality.html [https://perma.cc/PZ4Z-4REN].
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million transactions; banks would deposit 36 million checks
in the wrong accounts every day; and deaths from airplane
crashes would increase one thousand-fold.38

As Hyman and Silver comment, “[a]n error rate of 20% would
be intolerable in the business settings identified, but error rates
as high as 79% have been observed in health care.”39
In sum, the incidence of iatrogenic injury and death is
enormous, while the cost to the healthcare industry (in terms of
compensation of the victims) is remarkably modest. Can such a
favorable gain-loss profile be made even better?
C. Making an Excellent Situation Better

Ironically, an industry that pays proportionately so little to
insure itself against the cost of accidents is the same industry that
generates more accidental death and injury (as a byproduct of its
work) than the combined total of all other human activity in the
nation.40 If the industry causing the harm isn’t paying for the
losses that it negligently produces, then who is? The bulk of these
losses are externalized onto victims and their families, first-party
health insurers, and taxpayers, through government insurance
programs.
How can a lobbyist persuade a legislature to help make this
already highly favorable situation even more favorable to the
industry? Answer: By turning the relatively small cost of the
malpractice liability system into a far larger number. In order to
accomplish this, lobbyists turn to the concept of defensive
medicine. Healthcare providers, mostly physicians and
hospitals—so the argument goes—are so afraid of becoming
defendants in malpractice lawsuits that they lard needless tests

38.

Mark R. Chassin, Is Health Care Ready for Six Sigma Quality?, 76
THE MILBANK Q. 565, 566–67 (1998); See also Mark R. Chassin,
High-reliability Health Care: Getting There from Here, 91 THE
MILBANK Q. 459, 480 (2013).

39.

David Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care
Quality in the U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or
Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 893, 949 (2005)
[hereinafter Hyman & Silver—2005].

40.

Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, Defensive Medicine and
Disappearing Doctors?, 28 REG. 24, 28 (2005) [hereinafter Baicker
& Chandra—Disappearing Doctors].

34

Health Matrix·Volume 30·2020
The Paradoxes of Defensive Medicine

and procedures onto the nation’s healthcare bill.41 No one knows
how much all of these wasteful tests and procedures really cost
us, but speculative amounts are offered by proponents who, given
the nature of their assignment, reach for the largest numbers they
can assert short of triggering disbelief or laughter. The most
extreme of those imaginary numbers transforms the
approximately one-quarter of one percent of healthcare costs into
something a legislator might be persuaded to worry about.
Various estimates have been advanced. Philip Howard,
founder of Common Good, an organization which promotes the
idea of removing medical malpractice disputes from conventional
courts, floated the figure of $100 billion in 2003.42 In 2018 dollars,43
that number grows to $137 billion. His estimate was flayed as
“grossly exaggerated” by Hyman and Silver.44 Undeterred, others
outbid him. A 2003 Health and Human Services (HHS) report
gave figures of $70–126 billion,45 which is a range of $96–173
billion in 2018 dollars. The American Tort Reform Association
asserted annual-defensive-medicine expenditures of $200 billion,46
which is $210 billion in 2018 dollars. Topping that, in 2014, the
41.

See, e.g., Tancredi & Barondess, supra note 4, at 879; Defensive
Medicine and Medical Malpractice: Hearing before the Committee
on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate, 98th Cong.,
2nd Sess. (July 10, 1984); R.E. Anderson, Billions for Defense: The
Pervasive Nature of Defensive Medicine, 159 ARCHIVES OF
INTERNAL MED. 2399, 2399 (1999).

42.

Philip K. Howard, Legal Malpractice, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 27, 2003),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1043634286859254944
[https://perma.cc/XXC9-WYQV].

43.

Inflation Calculator, U.S. INFLATION CALCULATOR, https://www.
usinflationcalcualtor.com/ [https://perma.cc/E2PE-M7NL] (last
visited Nov. 24, 2019).

44.

David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Believing Six Improbable
Things: Medical Malpractice and Legal Fear, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 107, 113–14 (2004).

45.

U.S. DEP’T HEALTH HUM. SERVS., ADDRESSING THE NEW HEALTH
CARE CRISIS: REFORMING THE MEDICAL LITIGATION SYSTEM TO
IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE 11 (2003), available at
https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/72871/medliab.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AAN8-8TWZ].

46.

Health Cost Containment and Efficiencies, NAT’L CONF. OF ST.
LEGIS. (Oct. 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/documents/
health/MedicalMalReform-2011.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZD99FCZT].
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healthcare economics firm BioScience Valuation put the amount
above $480 billion annually.47 And Jackson Healthcare, a
healthcare organization based in Miami, did even better, with a
figure of $650–$850 billion,48 which could be as little as $713
billion, or as much as $933 billion, in 2018 dollars. For
policymakers looking for a solution to America’s exorbitant
healthcare costs, these numbers attract attention.49
47.

Wayne Oliver & Jeffrey Segal, To Reduce Healthcare Costs
Eliminate, Don’t Reform, the Malpractice System, THE HILL (Oct.
23, 2014), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/healthcare/
221533-to-reduce-healthcare-costs-eliminate-dont-reformmalpractice [https://perma.cc/Z9WR-ZJ22].

48.

See Physician Study: Quantifying the Cost of Defensive Medicine,
JACKSON HEALTHCARE, https://jacksonhealthcare.com/mediaroom/surveys/defensive-medicine-study-2010 [https://perma.cc/
76BJ-2A3N] (last visited Nov. 8, 2019) [hereinafter Jackson
Healthcare Study #1]; Physicians on Medical Liability Reform
Options: An Online Quantitative Research Study, JACKSON
HEALTHCARE (Dec. 5, 2012), https://jacksonhealthcare.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/PDF/phys_on_med_liability_reform_
112612_weighted_by_specialty.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T44CXK2T] [hereinafter Jackson Healthcare Study #2]. Their figures
were arrived at by asking doctors to “guestimate” what percentage
of the procedures that they and their colleagues order were
motivated by concerns about malpractice litigation. Their average
responses were twenty-six to thirty-four percent, which, when
multiplied by the total national healthcare bill, produces those
numbers. This guestimate was picked up by then-Congressman
(and later, Secretary of HHS, briefly in 2017) Tom Price and
repeated in a press release. Tom Price, Gallup: 26% of Health Care
Dollars Spent to Fend Off Trial Bar, REPUBLICAN STUDY COMM.
(Feb. 22, 2010), https://rsc.woodall.house.gov/news/document
single.aspx?DocumentID=171421 [https://perma.cc/L2G5-GCUU]
(“[P]hysicians estimated that 21 percent of everything they do can
be attributed to the practice of defensive medicine.”).

49.

Healthcare industry leaders and lobbyists have already had
considerable success persuading legislatures to adopt a variety of
malpractice tort reforms. Most of these reforms are aimed at
reducing the number of patients who can bring claims, making the
traditionally tiny proportion of injury victims who do so even tinier,
and to reduce the amount of compensation that can be received by
those whose claims prevail. Overall, the reforms have succeeded in
cutting the number of malpractice claims by nearly two-thirds over
the past several decades. See Myungho Paik et al., The Receding
Tide of Medical Malpractice Litigation: Part I – National
Trends, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 612, 612 (2013); See also,
Michelle Mello et al., The Medical Liability Climate and Prospects
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As explained in the margin, those numbers come from shaky
foundations. But if defensive medicine actually exists in
something like the form and extent usually asserted, then it not
only wastes vast resources, it also adds to the dangers confronting
patients: they are subjected to needless tests, radiation,
medication, sometimes surgery, and other low-value (or no-value)
medical care. By calming doctors’ fears, medical malpractice
reform would arguably prevent hundreds of billions of dollars of
worthless healthcare expenditures and protect patients from the
risks associated with unnecessary and excessive healthcare.

II. Why Commit and Why Admit?
The reasons for engaging in defensive practices seem obvious
at first. The healthcare industry is organized in a way that loads
as much as possible of the insurance-cost burden of iatrogenic
injuries onto physicians, even when much of the cause and the
capability to prevent is within the control of larger organizational
units. If you are a provider on whom that burden personally falls,
then you understandably want to do something to lighten—or
avoid—the burden.
A.

Why Engage in Defensive Medicine?

Imagine that you could reduce the chances of your house
burning down by (1) spending someone else’s money (for example,
your clients’, their insurers’, or the taxpayers’ money), and (2)
paying yourself a bonus for taking the trouble to spend those
other people’s money. Some or many homeowners would probably
do this. For medical malpractice, the analogy proceeds like so:
The greater a physician perceives the risk of a malpractice lawsuit
for Reform, 312 JAMA 2146 (2014). A review of the empirical
research on the effects of these reforms found that damage caps
have had the greatest impact: They have been found to produce
“substantial savings” on payments to victims and to have imposed
a “modest restraint on growth of malpractice premiums.” Allen
Kachalia & Michelle M. Mello, New Directions in Medical Liability
Reform, 364 N. ENG. J. MED. 1564, 1568 (2011). More than half of
the states have adopted limitations of one form or another on
awards of non-economic damages; some have done so for total
damages (economic as well as so-called non-economic). These caps
have reduced mean payment per claim by as much as forty percent.
See FRANK A. SLOAN & LINDSEY M. CHEPKE, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE (2008).
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to be and the more tests and other procedures that the physician
orders, then the more money the physician and the industry get
to charge and the more the risk of being sued is reduced.50 The
desirability of that practice, at least for the practitioner, seems
beyond debate. Wouldn’t it be crazy not to?
But perhaps the self-serving benefits of defensive medicine are
not as clear as they first seem. To begin with, how are physicians
to know which actions actually will be protective? There is little
or no empirical evidence as to which actions that are medically
useless for patients will nevertheless reduce the risk of a
malpractice claim being initiated.
Moreover, how can defensive practices help when one of the
most-cited reasons for defensive practices is said to be that
patients and the litigation process are highly unpredictable?51
Paradoxically, it appears that engaging in defensive practices
bespeaks a belief in the existence of patient and legal-system
predictability—the alleged absence of which is a major reason for
engaging in defensive practices. Alternatively, if the defensive
practice is effective at reducing the risk of lawsuits by reducing
the risk of harmful error, then it’s not a defensive practice—it’s
good medical care.
Perhaps defensive practices are the product of superstition,
both in a psychological and anthropological sense. Superstitious
behavior is found in all societies and cultures.52 The noted
anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, while studying the people
of the Trobriand Islands, made a discovery about the causes of
superstitious behavior.53 Malinowski observed that the islanders
50.

Ann G. Lawthers et al., Physicians’ Perceptions of the Risk of
Being Sued, 17 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 463, 470, 476, 478
(1992).

51.

See, e.g., David M. Studdert and Michelle M. Mello, When Tort
Resolutions Are “Wrong”: Predictors of Discordant Outcomes in
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 547 (2007)
(“This pronouncement of the tort system’s inaccuracy in matching
compensation awards to the merits of claims has become a staple
in policy debates over medical liability reform. Assertions that the
system is a lottery in which compensation awards are little better
than random are commonly heard from the medical community and
others who advocate far-reaching reforms”).

52.

BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, MAGIC, SCIENCE,
(Joseph Needham ed., 1925).

53.

Id. at 30.
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had no superstitions associated with performing activities in
which the relation of actions to outcomes was predictable.54
Activities that were unpredictable and carried the risk of harm or
loss, however, were accompanied by superstitious practices.55
Fishing in the lagoons yielded a predicable amount of fish and
was safe, and to this activity no magic or superstitions were
attached.56 Fishing in the ocean, on the other hand, offered the
chance of making an especially large haul of fish, but also the risk
of coming home empty-handed (or not coming home at all):
Ocean fishing was accompanied by superstitions and magic.57
George Gmelch identified a similar pattern in our own society:
the rituals of baseball.58 According to Gmelch, baseball players
tend not to have superstitions in connection with fielding (which
they accomplish successfully 98.4% of the time); their
superstitions cluster around the less predictable activity of
batting (which they accomplish successfully only 24.8% of the
time).59
Perhaps something similar is true of the doctors who engage
in defensive medicine. Because lawsuits against doctors are so rare
relative to the number of patient contacts—and still rare even
when a doctor has, in fact, committed actionable-medical
negligence60—a doctor might correlate almost any behavior (albeit
in an illusory way) with the prospect of not being sued.61 For
54.

Id. at 31.

55.

Id.

56.

Id. at 32.

57.

Id.

58.

George Gmelch, The Rituals of Baseball, WASH. POST (July 16,
1978), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1978/
07/16/the-rituals-of-baseball/520382d5-2b17-4480-8574442f380a6c00/ [https://perma.cc/684K-XUUE].

59.

See id. The percentages are the overall averages for all players on
all teams in major league baseball for the 2018 season, and they
roughly correspond to Gmelch’s findings. Cf. 2018 MLB Team
Statistics, BASEBALL REF., https://www.baseball-reference.com/
leagues/MLB/2018.shtml [https://perma.cc/WKG6-2PXB] (last
visited Feb. 21, 2020).

60.

See Ashley M. Votruba & Michael J. Saks, Medical Adverse Events
and Malpractice Litigation in Arizona: By-the-Numbers, 45 ARIZ.
ST. L. J. 1537, 1551 (2013).

61.

According to KevinMD, a well-known weblog for and curated by
medical residents and physicians, doctors harbor many
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example, ordering an extra CT scan might seem to keep lawsuits
away; then again, so might wearing a protective necklace of garlic
bulbs. But coincidence is not even correlation: errors and harm
that sometimes produce a malpractice lawsuit most of the time
do not.62 And a lawsuit, whatever its disposition, is a dreaded
experience. Nothing is dependably known (that is, evidencebased) to reduce that very small risk to an even smaller risk.63 So,
perhaps, defensive practices arose to provide a feeling of control
over an uncontrollable situation. That is what all humans tend
to do when faced with high stakes and uncontrollable risks—not
just Trobriand Island fishermen and baseball players.64
Though evidence that defensive practices reduce lawsuits is
quite scarce, belief that defensive practices fend off lawsuits is
said to be common.65 Eventually, perhaps, defensive practices
superstitions indeed. See Elizabeth Breuer, M.D., Medical resident
superstition and black clouds, KEVINMD (Oct. 22, 2010),
https://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2010/10/med [https://perma.cc/
VLT5-HZ5Q]; See also 911Doc, MD, 7 favorite ER superstitions,
KEVINMD (Dec. 12, 2010), https://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2010/
12/favorite-er-superstitions.html
[https://perma.cc/GX3EXTMM].
62.

PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL
INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION
73 (1993) (finding that, on average, fewer than three legal claims
are filed for every 100 negligent adverse events); See PATRICIA M.
DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 22, 23 (1985); Marlynn L. May & Daniel B. Stengel, Who
Sues Their Doctors? How Patients Handle Medical Grievances, 24
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 105, 118 (1990) (studying why negligently
injured patients rarely sue); TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE MYTH 3 (2005) (reviewing similar findings).

63.

The first (and perhaps only) study to find any protective effect for
providers is said to be that of Anupam B. Jena et al., Physician
Spending and Subsequent Risk of Malpractice Claims: Observational Study, 351 BMJ h5516 (2015); See Molly Walker, ‘Defensive
Medicine’ Pays Off, Study Suggests, MEDPAGE TODAY (Nov. 5,
2015),
https://www.medpagetoday.com/practicemanagement/
medicolegal/54498 [https://perma.cc/8JR9-PBVQ].

64.

See generally STUART VYSE, BELIEVING IN MAGIC: THE PSYCHOLOGY
SUPERSTITION (2013).

OF

65.

Aaron Carroll, Defensive Medicine Isn’t So Cut and Dry, THE
INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (Feb. 8, 2013, 8:55 AM), https://
theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/defensive-medicine-isnt-socut-and-dry/ [https://perma.cc/8LX6-KWN6].
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become part of the folklore of the healthcare industry, and not
just something that a few individuals decide to do of their own
accord. Physicians and other providers are advised by teachers or
colleagues, and are also inundated with reading materials,
suggesting that one or another kind of self-protection might
help.66
Furthermore, lawyers sometimes advise physicians on how to
legally practice “safe” medicine. A number of years ago, one of
your authors attended a meeting of a medical school and its
teaching hospital on the topic of medical malpractice. At this
large, well-attended gathering, one of the speakers was the
hospital’s lawyer, who previously had been that state’s attorney
general. One piece of “advice” that he offered to the assembled
medical students, faculty, and staff was that, if in doubt, they
should deliver babies by cesarean section. Why? Simple, he
explained: I’d much rather defend a lawsuit for a needless
cesarean in which the baby came out healthy, than a case for the
failure to perform one that resulted in a damaged baby.67
B.

When is Defensive Medicine Actually Defensive?

Perhaps the logic of diagnosis and treatment68 teaches a
doctor that some actions will almost certainly reduce the risk of
harm, and in turn, the risk of a lawsuit. But such obvious benefits
to the patient—which, logically, are benefits to the doctor—make
those actions strange candidates for inclusion in the category of
defensive medicine. Keeping patients safe and healthy should be
66.

OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-H-602, DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, at 34 (July 1994), available at https://ota
.fas.org/reports/9405.pdf [https://perma.cc/AZU7-DHG7] [hereinafter OTA-H-602].

67.

C-sections carry their own risks to the mother, including
postoperative adhesions, incisional hernias (which could require
further surgery), and wound infections, with the rate of adverse
outcomes being slightly greater than that of vaginal deliveries. See
Aaron B. Caughney et al., Safe Prevention of the Primary
Cesarean Delivery, AM. J. OF OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 179,
179–80 (Mar. 2014). Professor Saks waited in vain for someone in
the audience to stand up and say something like: We are the
doctors, not you. We work for the patients, not for you. We are
not going to practice medicine in a manner calculated to make life
easier for our insurers and our lawyers. But, no one uttered a word.

68.

For a discussion on the diagnostic process, see generally IMPROVING
DIAGNOSIS IN HEALTH CARE 119 (Erin Balogh et al. eds., 2015).
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the central goal of the healthcare industry. Recall that the
essential definition of defensive medicine is that it helps the
doctor while doing little or no good for the patient. Where is the
line that divides well-intended, low-value care from self-dealing
and defensive practices?
Atul Gawande tells of the time that his own child, who had
fallen down some stairs, was taken to an emergency room,
examined, given a CT scan, observed, and cleared to go home.
Gawande explains that he “bullied the doctor into admitting him”
to the hospital for 24 hours and obtaining a repeat scan the next
day; as expected, “the scan and the patient were fine.”69
Suppose that the ER doctor had ordered the extra care
himself, without pressure from Gawande to do so (some in fact
do70). Was the supposedly excessive caution “defensive”; or, was
it the kind of care that a doctor would prefer for the doctor’s own
family, but which is presumably cost-ineffective and therefore
normally foregone? The inherent cost-ineffectiveness might make
it wasteful, but can it be said to be “defensive”? Gawande’s story
reminds us that nervous patients or families—even doctors
themselves—sometimes want more care than what is thought to
be necessary; and doctors sometimes comply with the patients’
wishes. But is that defensive medicine?
Gawande shared another example. Another surgeon was
scheduled to remove a patient’s thyroid because it contained
microcarcinoma—tiny, slow-growing cells that could, but were
very unlikely to, become cancerous.71 The patient wound up in
Gawande’s office because the original surgeon was attending to
his own health issues.72 Gawande suggested an alternative course
of treatment to the patient: the risk of cancer was minimal, the
risks of harm from the surgery were significant, and life without

69.

Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum, NEW YORKER (May 25,
2009),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/06/01/thecost-conundrum [https://perma.cc/C6G5-LVG5].

70.

See, e.g., Perry Hookman, In Defense of Defensive Medicine?, DR.
PERRY HOOKMAN BLOG (June 28, 2009), http://drperryhookman
.blogspot.com/2009/06/ [https://perma.cc/65QB-Q4AH].

71.

Atul Gawande, Overkill, NEW YORKER (May 4, 2015), https://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/05/11/overkill-atul-gawande
[https://perma.cc/9QF8-CHUQ] [hereinafter Gawande—Overkill].

72.

Id.
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a thyroid could be unpleasant.73 Additionally, he explained that
her thyroid could be monitored and, if the cells started to grow,
could always be removed later.74
At this point in the narrative, one might begin to think that
the patient was lucky to have crossed Gawande’s path because,
surely, he has convinced her to avoid a needless surgery. But the
punchline of the story is that the patient couldn’t bear the
thought of even a miniscule risk of cancer and had her
thyroidectomy anyway.75
Or consider this question, which one of us posed to his lawschool seminar: What should a doctor do when a patient asks for
a medication that the doctor knows will be useless for the
patient’s condition, but the patient is not convinced and insists
on trying the drug anyway? A medical student (who was also a
law student) in the class said that she would write the
prescription that the patient wanted. The student explained that
the patient will go elsewhere and find another doctor to write the
prescription, so it would be better to keep the patient’s business
and try to guide the patient over time to more beneficial
treatments. The student’s response demonstrates that
unnecessary treatment, with its waste and risks of harm, might
not always be the doctor’s fault—or desire. Indeed, patients
sometimes manage to put themselves at risk and waste healthcare
dollars, and their doctors merely go along.
While some presumptively defensive practices seem to benefit
(or at the very least do not harm) patients, other defensive
actions impose potential or actual harm, such as radiation,
infection, falls, and harmful drug reactions. By increasing the risk
of harm, these defensive practices increase the potential for a
lawsuit—the very thing the doctor was hoping to avoid. So, from
the provider’s viewpoint, a tradeoff is being made: the same
actions that might decrease the risk of a lawsuit in some ways
simultaneously increase the risk in other ways.76 Presumably, the
tradeoff is seen by the provider as favoring the interests of the
provider, otherwise the defensive action would not be taken.

73.

Id.

74.

Id.

75.

Id.

76.

Nested within this cost-to-benefit judgment there is, no doubt,
another query: the patient’s benefit-to-risk judgement.
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C. Why Would Anyone Admit to Engaging in Defensive Medicine?

It is one thing to engage in defensive practices, but quite
another to admit to the deed. Why do so? After all, defensively
ordering tests or treatments when the doctor believes that the
procedures offer no, or minimal, prospect of benefitting the
patient—but serve only the doctor’s self-interests—can be illegal
as well as unethical. Billing for needless services is a form of
healthcare fraud. The Medicare claim form, for example, requires
providers to certify that the services shown on the form were
medically indicated and necessary for the health of the patient.77
If the services are, in the belief of the doctor, not medically
necessary, the claim is false.
The principal gain of defensive medicine for the provider (i.e.,
protection from a lawsuit) is arguably a fraudulently-obtained
benefit. A prosecutor who has evidence of such behavior could
easily see criminality in it. If the prosecutor wanted to act, an
obvious charge would be criminal fraud.78 If the procedure exposes
the patient to risk of injury, then the physician might also be
charged with reckless endangerment.79 If the defensive practice
subjects the patient to wounds or radiation, then the prosecutor
might see the crime of assault and battery—because the patient
77.

CMS-1500, Health Insurance Claim Form, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/CMS-Forms/
CMS-Forms/Downloads/CMS1500.pdf [https://perma.cc/86U2MSMP] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).

78.

Fraud is a “knowing misrepresentation or knowing concealment of
a material fact made to induce another to act to his or her
detriment.” Fraud, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see
David A. Hyman, Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Market Change,
Social Norms, and the Trust “Reposed in the Workmen”, 30 J. OF
LEGAL STUD. 531 (June 2001); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
GAO-12-820, HEALTH CARE FRAUD: TYPES OF PROVIDERS
INVOLVED IN MEDICARE, MEDICAID, AND THE CHILDREN’S HEALTH
INSURANCE PROGRAM CASES (2012), available at https://www.
gao.gov/assets/650/647849.pdf [https://perma.cc/HNR2-EWZK]
[hereinafter GAO-12-820].

79.

The crime of reckless endangerment consists of a perpetrator
recklessly exposing a victim to a substantial risk of imminent death
or physical injury. A needless biopsy, surgery, or perhaps even
exposure to radiation could be viewed as constituting the requisite
risk of harm. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §13-1201 (2019). A
needless biopsy, surgery, or, perhaps, unnecessary exposure to
radiation could constitute the requisite risk of harm.
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was subjected to injury without having granted valid informed
consent.80
Leaving aside civil or criminal liability, defensive medicine
violates the principles of medical ethics.81 According to the
American Medical Association’s (AMA) Code of Medical Ethics,
one ethical precept of medicine is that, “[a] physician shall . . . be
honest in all professional interactions.”82 Moreover, physicians are
duty bound to report “to appropriate entities” colleagues they
find “engaging in fraud or deception.”83 Most important, the
model code instructs that “[a] physician shall, while caring for a
patient, regard responsibility to the patient as paramount.”84
Defensive medicine turns all of this on its head: the interests of
the physician are set above the interests of the patient by an act
of fraud.
So, again, why admit to engaging in defensive medicine? If
you were a physician and you realized that you routinely,
intentionally practiced in ways that were unethical, illegal,
universally condemned as wasteful of precious healthcare
resources, a “deviation from sound medical practice,”85 and
potentially harmful to the patients who placed their trust in
you—would you take every opportunity to proclaim your
misdeeds from the rooftops and the op-ed pages?
In fact, there was a time not very long ago when doctors did
not take kindly to the suggestion that they were practicing
defensive medicine. The accusation was regarded as an insult, an
accusation of misconduct, and the response was denial, not
enthusiastic affirmation. Medical commentary in the early 1970s
spoke of “the spectre of defensive medicine, with the connotation
80.

For valid informed consent, a physician would transparently
divulge to the patient that the procedure the physician wishes to
perform is expected to have no benefit to the patient but might
benefit the doctor if patient care goes badly. See Mohr v. Williams,
104 N.W. 12, 13 (Minn. 1905).

81.

See generally AMA Principles of Medical Ethics, AMA,
https://www.ama-assn.org/about/publications-newsletters/amaprinciples-medical-ethics [https://perma.cc/J6VQ-7TQV] (last
visited Feb. 24, 2020).

82.

Id.

83.

Id.

84.

Id.

85.

Studdert et al., supra note 5, at 2609–2610.
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that actions were motivated primarily by the desire to avoid
malpractice liability,” and argued that it was not happening.86
Physician and attorney Don Harper Mills was part of an
AMA Board of Trustees conference on medical costs in 1964.87 It
was his task to attempt to determine how much the malpractice
litigation system was contributing to the costs of health care.88
He found it easy “to establish the cost of [liability] insurance as a
direct effect of malpractice litigation on health care, but . . . much
more difficult to consider the indirect costs that physicians might
induce through the mechanism of defensive medicine.”89 He
surveyed physicians and learned that about twenty-five percent
of X-rays were, in the view of the doctors, unnecessary.90 But the
doctors said that they performed them not because of malpractice
concerns, but in response to pressure from patients who had been
injured in accidents and whose lawyers were preparing cases
against motorists or others alleged to be responsible for the
injuries.91 As to laboratory tests, he found that no more than five
percent were thought by doctors to be unnecessary, and of those,
only a fraction were being ordered out of “medicolegal
considerations.”92
Another study found “medicolegal factors” to be involved in
only one percent of laboratory tests. Of those, defensive practice
was not the main factor said to motivate the tests being ordered.
The authors of that research added that, “this study was
conducted shortly after a large increase in professional liability
insurance costs . . . which was accompanied by extensive public
and professional debate on the problem of malpractice
litigation,”93 to further support their conclusion that malpractice
fears did not cause doctors to order needless tests.
86.

Frank W. Kiel, Medical Malpractice Claims Against the Army, 75
MIL. L. REV. 1, 9 n. 22 (1977).

87.

Don Harper Mills, Information Please, 6 J LEGAL MED. 255, 256–
257 (1985).

88.

Id. at 257.

89.

Id.

90.

Id.

91.

Id.

92.

Id.

93.

Bradley G. Wertman et al., Why Do Physicians Order Laboratory
Tests?, 243 JAMA 2080, 2081 (1980).
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A 1971 paper reviewed the literature of defensive practices,
finding “the most significant allegation” to be that “the threat of
malpractice litigation raises the cost of medical care by inducing
physicians to overutilize diagnostic and treatment procedures.”94
Citing half of a dozen studies, the review concluded that “the
allegation that a physician responds to the increased threat of a
malpractice suit by practicing defensive medicine has not been
verified.”95 Its own studies of physicians in North Carolina and
California (conducted by asking physicians to respond to
hypothetical scenarios) concluded that some defensive medicine
was detected, but that “the practice is not extensive and does not
have as significant an impact as previously alleged.”96 Most of
those engaged in what appeared to be defensive practices argued
that whatever protection a test or treatment might offer the
doctor was outweighed by the medical benefits it provided to
patients. One interesting defensive practice that developed in
response to the perceived threat of malpractice litigation was to
keep more “detailed records of examinations and treatments.”97
Most of the doctors in the study felt that the innovation of
keeping careful patient records had medical as well as legaldefense benefits. Indeed, a 1974 article in the Journal of the
American Medical Association argued that “[d]efensive medicine
is good medicine.”98 In short, doctors said they didn’t do it—until
they started saying they do.
Today, the existence, magnitude, cost, and evils of defensive
medicine are touted widely and loudly by the healthcare industry.
In fact, most doctors now insist they and their colleagues are
practicing defensive medicine; in reporting its survey findings, one
large healthcare organization concluded that “[n]ine out of 10
physicians reported practicing defensive medicine . . . in an effort
to avoid lawsuits.”99 A follow-up study, by the Gallup
Organization, found that 73 percent of physicians acknowledged
94.

Duke Law J. Editorial Bd., The Medical Malpractice Threat: A
Study of Defensive Medicine, 1971 DUKE L. J. 939, 942 (1971).

95.

Id. at 943.

96.

Id. at 956–57.

97.

Id. at 963.

98.

Richard P. Bergen, Defensive Medicine Is Good Medicine, 228 J.
AM. MED. ASS’N 1188, 1189 (1974).

99.

Jackson Healthcare Study #1, supra note 48.
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that “they had practiced some form of defensive medicine in the
past 12 months,” and that such “[p]hysicians attribute 26 percent
of overall healthcare costs to the practice of defensive
medicine.”100 In another study of 824 specialists in surgery,
obstetrics, neurosurgery, emergency medicine and others, 93
percent reported practicing defensive medicine, such as ordering
unnecessary CTs, biopsies, and MRIs, and prescribing excessive
antibiotics.101 A more recent study found that 91 percent of
physicians believe that defensive medicine exists, resulting in the
administration of “more tests and procedures than necessary.”102
In a broader study of drivers of healthcare costs, many
physicians—of various specialties—”identified defensive medicine
as their primary reason for ordering additional tests, estimating
that it was responsible for 20–50 percent of their orders.”103 These
facts don’t confirm whether or not physicians actually practice
defensively on such a scale; they do, however, indicate that
physicians seem to think that they do, or at least are eager to say
that they do.
The spokespersons and lobbyists for the healthcare industry
promote the existence and the impact of defensive medicine and
do not hesitate to emphasize how terrible it is. They argue that
among its worst evils is that it imposes a major burden on society
by wasting healthcare dollars. They do not wonder whether it
exists or not. Industry lobbyists insist that it does and, what’s
more, they have a solution for it. Their remedy is (more)
malpractice liability reforms to ease doctors’ fear of lawsuits,
which will enable them to wean themselves from their defensive
ways.104

100. Jackson Healthcare Study #2, supra note 48.
101. Studdert et al., supra note 5, at 2612.
102. Tara Bishop et al., Physicians’ Views on Defensive Medicine: A
National Survey, 170 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1081, 1081
(2010).
103. Jonas B. Green, The Malpractice Muddle, 29 HEALTH AFF. 2355,
2355 (2010) (aggregating results from various specialties, included
surgeons, internists, anesthesiologists, family physicians, emergency
physicians, and medical subspecialists).
104. See Anderson, supra note 41, at 2399–2400.
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III. Does Defensive Medicine Actually Occur?
For serious researchers, the defensive-medicine hypothesis
presents a challenging mystery: Does it now, or did it ever,
actually exist? What has emerged from their research is a mosaic
of inconsistent and contradictory findings, with most of the tiles
in the mosaic simply missing. The main questions to be asked are:
(1) Do healthcare providers really engage in defensive medical
practices? (2) If so, how much is it done and how much waste and
harm does it generate? And, if that amount is substantial, then
(3) what effective and efficient steps could be taken to reduce the
problem?
Currently, the best answer to the first two questions is that
there is no answer, at least not any based on sound and sufficient
data. As will become evident from our review of the research,
infra, thoughtful researchers regard the answers as being
remarkably elusive.105 Their consensus belief is that, if defensive
medicine exists, whatever its extent, the dollar cost of wasteful
procedures attributable to defensive medicine is a thin shadow of
what the industry’s campaigners argue it is. Consequently,
reforms of tort law are unable to make much of a contribution to
bringing down America’s unusually high healthcare costs.
Let’s unpack those findings and conclusions. The essential
challenge to researchers is that because multiple motives overlap
and overlay each other, the research must find a way to
disentangle a set of confounded motives. When a doctor orders a
test or recommends a procedure, what has driven that choice? As
discussed above, it could be self-protection, serving the needs of
the patient, or the desire to make money. Under the fee-forservice model that has dominated American healthcare, it is
axiomatic that the more services provided, the more services for
which the industry can bill. As countless researchers, policy
analysts, reformers, and commentators have pointed out, all of
the incentives in the healthcare system—not just money, but
medical training, professional norms, patient desires, and almost
105. Yet, many of those same researchers emerge from their work
exactly where they started—pretty sure that defensive medicine
occurs; based, obviously, on something other than sound research
evidence. It is as if they are saying “it’s got to be there; we just
can’t find good evidence of it.” See Michael Frakes, Defensive
Medicine and Obstetric Practices, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 457,
461–62 (2012).
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everything else—point toward doing more: test more, scan more,
treat more.106 Defensive medicine is only one of a number of causes
of excessive and unnecessary care. How is one to separate the
motivation of lawsuit fear from the numerous other forces that
all push towards the same outcome?
How exactly does one define defensive medicine? If healthcare
providers feel pressured to do medically desirable things to avoid
malpractice—wash their hands, follow good medical practices,
keep accurate patient records—is that “defensive”? Some believe
that it is. If this is the case, however, then one could argue that
the malpractice system is working as intended and producing
desirable effects, since it has incentivized effective and safe
medical practices. This can also work the other way around:
Practices that have little value for patients, but that seemingly
protect the doctor, might become routine practices. In that case,
many practitioners would not realize that these were originally
defensive tactics. Doctors using such procedures might think they
are not acting defensively, but are instead just following standard
practice, although what they are doing could still be understood
as defensive practice. What if a doctor realizes that a given
diagnostic or treatment procedure has potential value for the
patient—and a potentially defensive benefit for the doctor? Is
that dual-premised benefit “defensive,” or not?
In 1994, the congressional Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA) proposed the following oft-employed definition of
defensive medicine: “Defensive medicine occurs when doctors
order tests, procedures, or visits, or avoid high-risk patients or
procedures, primarily (but not necessarily solely) to reduce their
exposure to malpractice liability.”107 Others have developed polar
definitions such as “positive” defensive medicine—“assurance
behavior,” taking extra steps—and “negative” defensive
106. See, e.g., Gawande—Overkill, supra note 71; Ity Shurtz,
Malpractice Law, Physicians’ Financial Incentives, and Medical
Treatment: How Do they Interact?, 57 J. L. & ECON. 1 (Feb. 2014)
(finding that physicians are performing fewer procedures that incur
expenses and increasing services that are deemed more profitable
to execute; and, when procedures become more profitable to
perform, the financial incentives tend to offset the malpractice
liability concerns of providing the service); Jonathan Bergman et
al., Service Intensity and Physician Income: Conclusions from
Medicare’s Physician Data Release, 175 J. AM. MED. ASS’N:
INTERNAL MED. 297, 298 (2015).
107. OTA-H-602, supra note 66, at 13.
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medicine—“avoidance behavior,” refraining from treating certain
patients or using certain procedures. Other factors in some
definitions include whether the defensive practice is conscious or
unconscious, or whether the action is taken solely or primarily for
the doctor’s benefit rather than the patient’s.108 The clearest
definition is Sloan and Shadle’s purely economic analysis: “only
care for which expected cost exceeds expected benefits” counts as
defensive medicine.109 Whether conduct is “defensive” or not will
sometimes, or often, depend on the definitional lens through
which the behavior is being viewed. Thus, one might want to take
note of a researcher’s conceptual and operational definitions of
defensive medicine as part of assessing whether a study and its
findings succeed in answering policy questions of concern.
The studies that have been undertaken fall into three basic
groupings. The first, “direct physician surveys,” simply ask
providers what they do and why they do it.110 The second,
“clinical scenario surveys,” ask doctors how they would treat
patients who present with various symptoms and histories. The
doctors choose from a set of options what clinical actions they
would take and to indicate what factors led to their choices. The
third consist of “multivariate statistical analyses,” an assortment
of complex analytics111 of existing datasets. These tests might be
able to reveal the impact of malpractice risk on actual utilization
of medical services.
Each of these types of research, owing to its own particular
strengths and limitations, has fallen short of providing sufficiently
108. DIANE E. HOFFMAN & BRADLEY HERRING, REPORT TO THE
MARYLAND HEALTH SERVICES COST REVIEW COMMISSION ON
DEFENSIVE MEDICINE, at 3 (Feb. 15, 2015), available at
https://hscrc.maryland.gov/Documents/commission-meeting/
2015/03-11/Defensive-Medicine-Final-Report-3-16-15.pdf [https://
perma.cc/VDR6-H76B].
109. Sloan & Shadle, supra note 4, at 481.
110. For example, “Does fear or threat of malpractice liability influence
whether you use additional diagnostic or therapeutic procedures?”
or, “How often do you practice defensive medicine?” See, e.g.,
HAROLD J. BURSZTAJN ET AL., FEAR OF MALPRACTICE LIABILITY
AND ITS ROLE IN CLINICAL DECISION MAKING (1991); Jackson
Healthcare Study #2, supra note 48.
111. See O. Paliy & V. Shankar, Application of Multivariate Statistical
Analyses of Existing Datasets, 25 MOL. ECOL. 1032, 1083 (2016)
(demonstrating various multivariate statistical analyses in Box 1).
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sound and complete answers to the most important questions
about defensive medicine. One general problem that can haunt
any type of study is the “file drawer problem.”112 This problem is
a consequence of an important type of publication bias wherein
studies that find no effects—the data do not show that X causes
Y—are less likely to be accepted for publication than those
finding a measurable effect—the data support a conclusion that
X causes Y. To illustrate the file drawer problem, imagine that a
researcher hypothesizes that singing in the shower prevents
cancer. The researcher carries out seventeen studies, all of which
fail to show a protective relationship between singing and cancer.
Those results wind up in the “file drawer”—if not the
wastebasket. The eighteenth test yields the hypothesized results;
they find a home in a journal. When others search the research
literature to see whether singing protects against cancer, the one
positive study will be found. The seventeen null findings will not
be found. This kind of selection bias also means that the one
finding that did get published likely was a false conclusion
resulting from type I error.113 When other researchers try to
replicate the finding that singing prevents cancer, and they
cannot replicate it, we have an instance of replication failure. 114
For present purposes, the file-drawer problem means that, of
equally well-done studies, those that find a measurable effect are
more likely to have become part of the literature than those not
finding an effect. Dim and potentially distorted as the light might
be that this body of research casts, it is all that anyone has with
which to answer the questions.
112. Robert Rosenthal, File Drawer Problem and Tolerance for Null
Results, 86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 638, 638 (1979).
113. In statistical-hypothesis testing, “type I error” is a rejection of the
null hypothesis when the null hypothesis is true. In other words, it
is a research conclusion that suggests that a relationship exists,
when in reality it does not exist. Type 1 Error, STAT TREK,
https://stattrek.com/statistics/dictionary.aspx?definition=type
_i_error [https://perma.cc/L9MP-BHZG] (last visited Nov. 23,
2019).
114. Theodore D. Sterling, Publication Decisions and Their Possible
Effects on Inferences Drawn from Tests of Significance—or Vice
Versa, 54 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 30 (1959). This problem likely is one
of the reasons for the “replication crisis” that is being experienced
in biomedical, economic, and other areas of research, where
published findings cannot be replicated. Research communities in
various fields are hard at work trying to solve it.
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As we have seen, several decades ago, physicians responded
to surveys asking about their defensive practices by denying that
they engaged in them. Rather, they said, they ordered tests and
procedures for reasons of sound medical practice. Sometime
during the 1970s their answers began to turn around. Today, the
same professional populations overwhelmingly insist that they do
engage in defensive practices, generating high rates of reported
defensive medical practice that, as noted earlier, sometimes reach
above ninety percent.115
What such percentages mean is a bit mysterious. Perhaps the
leap from low numbers to high numbers describes the reality of
different times and different behavior. Or, perhaps, what has
changed is the politically correct answer to the question. For
strategic reasons, what was once a badge of shame has arguably
become a badge of honor.116 But their actual and reported
actions—and their actual and reported rationales—are not always
in synch. Survey respondents are quite capable of answering
consequential questions strategically—often in line with their
tribe’s current norms—rather than offering genuinely candid
responses.117 In the research business, this is known as “social
115. See, e.g., Studdert et al., supra note 5, at 2612 (finding that ninetythree percent of physicians in high-risk specialties during a period
of increasing insurance costs in one state reported that they
engaged in defensive practices; one third of whom even admitted
recommending unnecessary and invasive procedures); Jackson
Healthcare Study #1, supra note 48 (finding ninety-two percent in
an earlier survey conducted by Jackson alone); MASS. MED. SOC’Y,
INVESTIGATION OF DEFENSIVE MEDICINE IN MASSACHUSETTS (2008)
(finding that eighty-three percent of respondents reported that they
engaged in defensive practices); Jackson Healthcare Study #2,
supra note 48 (finding that seventy-five percent of surveyed
physicians reported practicing defensive medicine primarily “to
avoid being named in a potential lawsuit.”).
116. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Welfare Polls: A Synthesis, 81 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1875, 1905 (2006) (discussing things to worry about in
survey responses, among them that “the respondent is behaving
strategically and not answering the question truthfully . . . .”).
117. Response Bias: Definition and Examples, STATS. HOW TO (June
24, 2015), https://www.statisticshowto.datasciencecentral.com/
response-bias/ [https://perma.cc/ZD9U-JK4F]. This is not to say
that survey research cannot be useful for some other purposes, such
as asking someone to look at a product and declare whom they
believe manufactured it (as in trademark-infringement litigation).
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desirability bias.”118 People want to look good to those whose
opinions matter to them.
These are the most obvious methodological weaknesses of selfreport surveys.119 Others include: (1) low response rates, especially
by busy professionals; (2) recall biases; (3) heuristic biases; and
(4) questions that could not possibly elicit meaningful answers.
We describe some of these.
Typically, owing to the time pressures on practitioners and
the frequency of inquiries directed to them, physician surveys
have low response rates.120 The low response rates allow
respondents with stronger feelings about the subject matter to be
over-represented in the sample. Logically, if a survey receives few
responses, and defensive practitioners disproportionately respond,
then the resulting sampling bias will drive up the “average”
amount of defensive practice reported.
Similarly, a variety of psychological distortions, chief among
them the tendency to inaccurately recall an event, can play havoc
with self-reports.121 Even where respondents try their best to
provide candid answers, instant recall of the choices they made
See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond, Reference Guide on Survey
Research, FED. JUD. CTR., REF. MANUAL ON SCI. EVIDENCE, 359,
366 (3rd ed. 2011).
118. Ivar Krumpal, Determinants of Social Desirability Bias in Sensitive
Surveys: A Literature Review, 47 QUALITY & QUANTITY 2025, 2025
(2013).
119. Id.
120. In reviewing direct physician surveys conducted up through the
1990s, OTA complained of response rates under fifty percent, which
created unacceptable risks of unrepresentativeness and
participation bias. OTA-H-602, supra note 66. Since then, response
rates seem to have fallen further. For example, in the
Massachusetts Medical Society Investigation of Defensive Medicine
in Massachusetts, only 23.6 percent of sampled doctors responded.
MASS. MED. SOC’Y, supra note 115. The survey by Jackson
Healthcare consisted of “over 3000” physicians out of 138,686
invited to respond—a two-percent response rate. Jackson
Healthcare Study #1, supra note 48. Conversely, David M.
Studdert and colleagues were able to achieve a sixty-five percent
response rate. Studdert et al., supra note 5, at 2610.
121. ROGER TOURANGEAU, LANCE J. RIPS & KENNETH RASINSKI, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF SURVEY RESPONSE 86, 125, 143–144 (2000). The
balance of this paragraph are a few examples from a large catalog
of such problems. Id.
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in each case over a defined period of time, or mentally averaging
them, can prove to be difficult or impossible. Efforts to provide
answers suffer from unintentional cognitive biases. For example,
when asked to estimate the frequency of occurrence of something,
our minds equate the ease (or difficulty) of recall with higher (or
lower) frequency. This is known to cognitive scientists as the
“availability” heuristic. If survey respondents have heard others
offer “guestimates,” then they too will tend to conform their own
guestimates to those they have heard before. This is known as the
heuristic of anchoring.122
Direct physician surveys typically pose vague or general
questions; responses can hardly be any less vague or general.123
Respondents typically are asked whether concerns about
malpractice have caused them to practice more defensively.124
Sometimes they are asked how frequently concerns about
malpractice liability caused them to do so (“never, rarely,
sometimes, often”).125 The responses to such questions cannot

122. In the classic experiment on this effect, a wheel of fortune was spun
that (unbeknownst to the research participants) was set to stop
randomly at either the number ten or sixty-five. Participants were
asked whether the percentage of African nations in the U.N. was
greater or smaller than that number. Then they were asked to
estimate the percentage of nations in the U.N. that were African.
Those participants whose wheel had stopped at ten generated lower
estimates (twenty-five percent on average) than participants whose
wheel stopped at sixty-five (forty-five percent on average). Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1128 (1974).
123. GEORGE F. BISHOP, THE ILLUSION OF PUBLIC OPINION: FACT AND
ARTIFACT IN AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION POLLS 14 (2004)
(commenting on “the fog of public opinion created by the
ambiguity of language used in most survey questions. Ever since
the inception of modern polling, survey researchers have struggled
with the Achilles heel of their measuring instrument: the frequently
vague meaning of survey questions”; noting “the penchant of many
respondents for answering questions which have no meaning for
them . . . .”; and noting that “[r]espondents answer vaguely worded
questions in idiosyncratic ways.”).
124. Examples of the language can be found in OTA-H-602, supra note
66; Studdert et al., supra note 5, at 2610; Jackson Healthcare Study
#2, supra note 48.
125. As to these issue-quantifying efforts, see N.C. Schaeffer, Hardly
Ever or Constantly? Group Comparisons and Vague Quantifiers,
55 PUB. OPINION Q. 395 (1991) (finding that categories using vague
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offer much specificity: exactly how many procedures, of what
kinds, under what circumstances, and with what costs or benefits,
are defensive. Whether 3% or 93% of doctors say that sometime
in the preceding year they did something to someone that they
felt was defensive in nature, we still know very little about how
common or how costly the problem is.
Discerning our motives for doing something can be more
difficult than most of us assume. Whatever the real cause of our
behavior, we are capable of quickly inventing a plausible
explanation which might or might not have something to do with
why we did what we did.126 For this reason, serious researchers
are skeptical about the usefulness of the just-ask approach to
learning about the incidence of defensive practices. The OTA
review considered the direct physician survey results to be “highly
quantifiers—for example, “a few,” “some,” and “many”—are
interpreted differently across respondents).
126. See, e.g., John M. Darley & C. Daniel Batson, “From Jerusalem to
Jericho”: A Study of Situational and Dispositional Variables in
Helping Behavior, 27 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 100, 107-08
(1973). In their experiment, volunteer seminary students at
Princeton University were sent across campus to record an ad that
they were to improvise along the way. It asked them to explain
why they were pursuing their careers. Half were assigned to talk
about the practical benefits of a career as a minister; the other half
were assigned to talk about service to others. Each of those halves
was further subdivided, with half given a recording time that
allowed a leisurely walk to the studio and the other half an
appointment for which they would have to hustle to not to be late.
Along the way, an actor who feigned illness was lying by the path,
pleading for help. Most of the seminarians who were unrushed
stopped to help, but most of those who were in a hurry passed by
the sick person. That seemingly trivial variable—the press of
time—was the major predictor of whether they offered help or not,
rather than factors we or they would expect to matter, such as
personality, backgrounds, attitudes and beliefs related to religious
commitment, service to others, and so on. But when asked what
led them to help or not, participants in such studies are usually
clueless about what really drove their actions (or inaction). See
generally id. Relatedly, as Jonathan Haidt has made famous
through his metaphor of the “emotional dog and its rational tail,”
when we are required to offer reasons for our behavior, we are
remarkably skilled at formulating rational-sounding explanations
which might have nothing to do with the actual drivers of our
behavior, which even the behaver is not sure of. Jonathan Haidt,
The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist
Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 814 (2001).
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suspect,” especially due to something researchers today would call
“priming”—the questions “invariably prompt responding
physicians to consider malpractice liability as a factor in their
practice choices.”127 That is, if the question cannot be asked
without raising concerns for litigation and defensive medicine,
then the answers that are elicited will be infected by concerns
about, and efforts to connect answers to, litigation and defensive
medicine.128 And, if it’s difficult to accurately access the
competing factors in one’s own decisions, imagine how much
harder it would be to accurately discern what one’s colleagues did
and why they decided to do those things.
Nevertheless, pollsters sometimes ask unanswerable
questions129 and, because people responding to surveys can
generate replies to any question posed, responses will come
forth.130 Surveys of belief and opinion are sure to generate data.
This happens even when those being polled do not know, and
could not know, the actual answer to the questions asked.131 A
well-known Marist poll illustrates the point. When researchers
asked whether space aliens exist, sixty percent of survey
respondents answered, “yes.”132 When those responding
127. OTA-H-602, supra note 66, at 5.
128. Id.
129. Familiar examples are questions about what will happen at some
time in the future. See, e.g., Melia Robinson, Here’s What
Americans Think the World Will Be Like in 2036, BUS. INSIDER
(June 27, 2016, 7:58 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/
predictions-about-the-future-2016-6
[https://perma.cc/A8FAV2C2] (explaining causes of (or solutions to) problems that
respondents can do no better than guess about or matters on which
the respondents have no experience or knowledge whatsoever).
130. JON A. KROSNICK & STANLEY PRESSER, QUESTION AND
QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN 5–6 (Peter v. Mardsen & James D. Wright
eds., 2d. 2010) (“A more dramatic shortcut is to skip the retrieval
and judgment steps altogether. That is, respondents may interpret
each question superficially and select what they believe will appear
to be a reasonable answer. The answer is selected without reference
to any internal psychological cues specifically relevant to the
attitude, belief, or event of interest. Instead . . . the respondent
may select an answer completely arbitrarily.”).
131. See Robert Cooke, Life Out There? Majority Thinks So,
NEWSDAYUSA (Dec. 16, 1997), available on Westlaw NewsRoom
at 1997 WLNR 586871.
132. Id.
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affirmatively were then asked to compare the intelligence of space
aliens and earthlings, forty-seven percent asserted that the extraterrestrials were more intelligent, thirteen percent thought they
were less intelligent, and forty percent thought we were “about
the same.”133 Can such “research findings” be taken as a serious
guide to the existence and IQs of space aliens?
Similarly, whether or not they are capable of knowing how
much defensive medicine is practiced as a result of fear of
lawsuits, physician respondents provide responses. Those
responses can be put to work to create other “facts” and policy
arguments. For example, Jackson Healthcare conducted its own
survey of doctors and asked them to estimate the overall
percentage of healthcare costs that were attributable to defensive
medicine.134 The answer was a staggering thirty-four percent.135
Jackson then hired the Gallup Organization to repeat the survey
(with presumably better design, sampling, and questioning). The
new answer was twenty-six percent.136 Multiplying those findings
by the total cost of healthcare, which the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services at that time estimated to be $2.5 trillion,137
yielded Jackson Healthcare’s assessment: “between $650 billion
and $850 billion are being spent each year due to defensive, or
lawsuit-driven, medicine.”138
How seriously can the self-report survey approach be taken?
OTA concluded after its extensive review of similar surveys that
they had little value: “Survey-based estimates of the national cost
of defensive medicine advanced by researchers at several
organizations are unreliable and potentially biased.”139 Although
simple surveys of complicated issues are notorious for providing
little in the way of meaningful information, they are nevertheless
frequently employed because they are relatively cheap and easy
to do.140 This is not to say that direct physician surveys cannot
133. Id.
134. Jackson Healthcare Study #1, supra note 48.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. OTA-H-602, supra note 66, at 74.
140. A comparison of the next two research approaches—clinical
scenario surveys and multivariate statistical analyses—will make
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be of value when they inquire about something that the
respondents are in a good position to know something about and
ways are found to obtain candid answers. But, on the topic of
defensive medicine, it’s hard to see of what value such “data”
would be apart from lobbying.
B. Clinical Scenario Surveys

An alternative approach is to present descriptions of specific
cases to samples of physicians and asking them how they would
handle the case: what tests, what treatments, and why. Responses
to broad, general survey questions and more concrete, specific
clinical scenarios can produce dramatically different results. For
example, Stalans and Diamond found in their 1990 study that
survey respondents generally stated that most criminal sentences
are too short. But, when the researchers described specific crimes
and asked what the proper sentence should, respondents on
average recommend lower sentences than what the courts actually
give.141 Thus, different research approaches to the same question
can lead to very different conclusions.
In the defensive medicine context, case scenarios have been
designed to allow researchers to infer whether the clinical choices
deviate from what is medically appropriate in ways that serve the
interests of the doctor more than they benefit the patient.142
Compared to the surveys described above, scenario studies are
few and far between (for the same reasons that direct-ask surveys

demonstrate the point. See also, Michael J. Saks, Scientific Method:
The Logic of Drawing Inferences from Empirical Evidence, in
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY § 4:6 (David L. Faigman et al., eds., 2018–19)
[hereinafter Saks—Scientific Method] (“It is easier to ask someone
how often they drive while intoxicated than it is to try to follow
them around and directly observe the behavior. But, as the example
makes apparent, the price of ease of inquiry may be decreased
accuracy.”).
141. Loretta J. Stalans & Shari S. Diamond, Formation and Change in
Lay Evaluations of Criminal Sentencing: Misperception and
Discontent, 14 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 199, 200 (1990).
142. OTA-H-602, supra note 66, at 75.
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are so numerous: cost and difficulty).143 Actual medical knowledge
is needed to prepare the scenarios and to evaluate the responses.144
Scenario surveys can be conducted without prompting or
priming—that is, conveying in any way that “this study is about
defensive medicine and how you feel about malpractice
litigation,” thereby evoking respondents’ thoughts and feelings
about those issues. But these surveys also reveal only what
respondents say rather than what they do. Still, a major virtue of
the scenarios is that they are so specific. Instead of a vague count
of how many doctors feel they acted defensively, the doctor reacts
to a specific description of a patient with specific health problems.
Specificity is also a limitation of the scenario approach because
the responses cannot easily be generalized to other patients and
other conditions. To obtain a more complete picture of how much
defensive medicine is (impliedly) practiced, a wide range of
scenarios would have to be presented to many different doctors.
The OTA’s conclusion from the scenario studies it reviewed and
the new studies it conducted was: “Although it is possible to
identify particular clinical situations in which defensive medicine
plays a relatively major role, it is impossible in the final analysis
to draw any conclusions about the overall extent or cost of
defensive medicine.”145
Most of the clinical scenario studies by OTA and others were
chosen and “specifically designed to increase the likelihood of [a]
defensive response by physicians.”146 Thus, they were not
representative of most diagnostic situations that doctors would
encounter. Even so, doctors responding to these scenarios
employed defensive practices very little.147 Certain scenarios did,
however, arouse more cautious responses than others. For
143. See id. at 41–42.
144. Direct-ask surveys pose a question like: “Have you increased
defensive practices out of malpractice liability concerns?” while
clinical scenarios involve designing cases with specific medical facts,
diagnostic options, and treatment options–and knowing which are
standard practice within the appropriate specialty and which
reflect excessive caution. See generally Phil EM Smith & John C
Mucklow, Writing Clinical Scenarios for Clinical Science
Questions, 16 CLINICAL MED. 142, 142 (2016).
145. OTA-H-602, supra note 66, at 74.
146. Id. at 56.
147. Id.
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example, the survey presented a “15-year-old boy with a minor
head injury resulting from a skateboard accident.”148 Nearly half
of the respondents said that they would order a CT scan, and
nearly half of those “said they would order it . . . primarily out
of concern for malpractice.”149
The contrast between the scenarios that did and did not elicit
defensive practices can potentially help refine our understanding
of when doctors act defensively, when they do not, and why. The
case example above represents a situation where the risk of
missing a serious diagnosis is small; but, if one is missed, then the
outcome could be catastrophic.150 Under such circumstances,
doctors are inclined to worry about error, harm to the patient,
and malpractice liability, all of which lead to them ordering more
testing than might be thought necessary.
On the one hand, this appears to be defensive behavior
prompted by fear of litigation because most CT scans carried out
under such circumstances will find the brain was undamaged.151
On the other hand, perhaps this is where an excess of caution
(and additional expense) benefits the patient by ensuring that
serious brain damage is not in the process of developing. Recall
Dr. Gawande’s insistence, earlier in this article, that his son get
the extra testing and observation in a very similar situation.
In another study using clinical scenarios, researchers hunted
for correlates of excessive resource use.152 They wondered if a
relationship might exist between apparent defensive practices and
the physicians’ history of defending malpractice claims.153 Might
those who had been sued previously be more vigilant about
avoiding future suits? The research found no evidence of such a
148. Id. at 5.
149. Id.
150. Herbert H. Engelhard, Subdural Hematoma Surgery, MEDSCAPE
(Aug. 10, 2018), https://emedicine.medscape.com/article/247472overview [https://perma.cc/Z37G-JUF5] (“The mortality of acute
SDH has been reported to be in the range of 36–79%. Many
survivors do not regain previous levels of functioning, especially
after an acute SDH severe enough to necessitate surgical drainage.
Favorable outcome rates after acute SDH range from 14% to
40%.”).
151. OTA-H-602, supra note 66, at 65.
152. Id. at 69.
153. Id.
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relationship.154 The only variables found to be consistently
correlated, across multiple scenarios, were doctors’ attitudes
toward cost consciousness and their subjective estimates of the
probability that they were dealing with a potentially severe health
problem.155 The analysis was that those who were more concerned
about costs tended to keep costs lower, while those who saw
higher risks of severe harm to a patient tended to want to do
more, as in the head injury cases.156
Overall, “[i]n clinical scenario surveys designed specifically to
elicit a defensive response, malpractice concerns were occasionally
cited as an important factor in clinical decisions. However,
physicians’ belief that a course of action is medically indicated
was the most important determinant of physicians’ clinical
choices.”157 The contrast between the conclusions reached based
on direct-ask surveys versus those from clinical scenarios
illustrates how powerful an impact research design can have on
what a study finds. A wholly different methodological approach
is to stop asking doctors what they say they have done or what
they say they would do, and to try to look at what they actually
do.
C. Multivariate Statistical Analyses

The third research approach consists of statistical analysis of
existing databases pertaining to the volume of tests and
procedures that doctors order in states with different levels of
malpractice risk. Defensive practice typically is measured in
dollars of excessive Medicare expenditures. Malpractice risk in
these studies has been measured by malpractice premiums,
incidence of lawsuits, or tort reforms. The basic idea is that where
malpractice risk is lower, doctors will be less fearful, and will
therefore practice less defensively, diagnose and treat less
intensely, and consequently cause fewer healthcare dollars to be
spent—all else being equal.158

154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 74.
158. For more on these concepts, see Katherine Baicker et al.,
Malpractice Liability Costs and the Practice of Medicine in the
Medicare Program, 26 HEALTH AFF. 841, 844 (2007).
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“All else being equal” is the Achilles’ heel of this approach.
In contrast to an experiment in which two or more groups are
created equal by random assignment to treatment conditions, but
then treated differently so that the treatment’s effects can be
compared on an apples-to-apples basis, two pre-existing groups
are rarely if ever “equal.” For example, patients in a state with
higher malpractice premiums might also have a population of
Medicare recipients who are older or poorer or sicker than those
in a state with less spending. Perhaps they face different health
problems for other reasons. Or, other changes in the state have
occurred—other legal reforms, for example—that confound
malpractice risk with other influences on Medicare spending.
Relying on healthcare spending to reflect the quantum of
defensive medicine presents a more unusual problem. For
example, treatment intensity varies as a function of the supply of
healthcare services, not only patients’ health needs.159 Moreover,
the blurry line between healthcare fraud and defensive medicine
has methodological implications. Studies that have compared
Medicare billings to patient records have found that the billings
can overstate healthcare actually provided, sometimes by a
considerable amount—a discrepancy of sixty to ninety percent,
depending on a patient’s diagnose.160 According to healthcarefraud expert Malcolm Sparrow, researchers who equate Medicare
billings with medical services actually provided are missing the
distorting effect of fraud on their data.161 Thus, in places where
Medicare fraud is higher, spending will be higher, and researchers
can mistake that for defensive medicine being be greater.
Let’s suppose that all of the confounding variables—patient
health status, different provider practice patterns, demographic
differences, state law differences, level of healthcare fraud, etc.—
could be controlled for on a state-by-state basis. If researchers
then compared State A which passed a particular tort reform act
against State B which lacks that reform, then the finding that
providers in State A billed for fewer Medicare dollars than

159. See, e.g., Elliott S. Fisher & John E. Wennberg, Health Care
Quality, Geographic Variations, and the Challenge of SupplySensitive Care, 46 PERSPS. IN BIOLOGY AND MED. 69, 73 (2003).
160. Paul Jesilow, The Effects of Fraud on the Evaluation of Health
Care, 13 HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 239, 241 (2005).
161. Joe Eaton, The War on Medicare Fraud, AARP BULL. (June 2016).
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providers in State B would be consistent with the hypothesis that
malpractice risk explains the difference.
But those inferences can be drawn soundly only if researchers
are able to disentangle the possible cause of interest from the
potential confounding variables by making statistical adjustments
using measures of those potentially confounding variables—the
“multivariate” in multivariate statistical analysis.162 These
adjustments are not simple and straightforward because the study
might not have collected data on a critically important
confounding variable, or the statistical model might contain the
potential confounder but under-adjust for its impact.
Inadequately controlled observational studies can result in
dramatically erroneous conclusions, as medical researchers know
all too well. For example, studies using such research designs led
to the conclusion that estrogen replacement was beneficial to
post-menopausal women.163 The methodological risk was that
women who sought and obtained hormone replacement differed
in various ways from those who did not—perhaps being
essentially healthier, wealthier, and taking better care of
themselves in various ways.164 Better health outcomes for those
women might seem to be attributable to the estrogen when in
reality they were attributable to those confounding factors.165
Eventually, better-designed research methods, randomized
controlled trials, discovered not only that hormone replacement
was not producing better health outcomes, but also that it was
dangerous for many women.166 Incorrect conclusions about
estrogen based on findings from multivariate, observational
(correlational) research designs led to tens of thousands of
avoidable breast cancers, heart attacks, and strokes.167
Despite its imperfections, the multivariate approach has the
virtue of dealing with the behavior of actual doctors making real
choices about treatment of real patients—not merely what
162. See generally ALVIN C. RENCHER AND WILLIAM F. CHRISTENSEN,
METHODS OF MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS (3d ed. 2012).
163. JERRY AVORN, POWERFUL MEDICINES: THE BENEFITS, RISKS,
COSTS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 28–9 (2004).
164. Id.at 36–37.
165. Id.at 37.
166. Id.at 33–34.
167. Id. at 38.
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doctors in surveys say they have done or would do. Keeping
reasonable cautions about confounds and file drawers and so on
in mind, we review the multivariate studies.
1. Studies and Their Findings: Cesarean Sections

One popular line of such studies looked at cesarean sections.
They did so because an obstetrician’s preference for delivering a
baby vaginally or surgically was suspected of being especially
sensitive to the malpractice risk climate.168 The assumption was
that, where the risk of malpractice litigation was higher,
obstetricians would perform an increased number of cesareans.169
Taken together, the results of the studies are inconclusive. Some
did find higher cesarean delivery rates where malpractice risk was
greater.170 Other studies found little evidence that cesarean rates
increased in response to higher malpractice risks or costs; or, they
found decreases in the rate of cesareans.171
168. Leonard J. Nelson III et al., Medical Liability and Health Care
Reform, 21 HEALTH MATRIX: J. OF L. MED. 443, 482–83 (2011).
169. Id.
170. See Lisa Dubay et al., The Impact of Malpractice Fears on
Cesarean Section Rates, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 491, 519 (1999)
(reviewing national birth data from 1990–92, and finding that
where malpractice premiums were higher, cesarean rates were
higher, primarily for patients in lower socioeconomic strata); A.
Russell Localio et al., Relationship Between Malpractice Claims
and Caesarean Delivery, 269 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 366 (1993) (using
New York State hospital claims data for 1984); Karna Murthy et
al., Association Between Rising Professional Liability Insurance
Premiums and Primary Cesarean Delivery Rates, 10 OBSTETRICS
& GYNECOLOGY 1264, 1265 (2007) (explaining that Illinois
obstetricians’ higher rates of primary cesarean delivery were
associated with higher medical-liability insurance premiums for
Illinois obstetricians-gynecologists).
171. See, e.g., Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, Medicare
Spending, the Physician Workforce, and Beneficiaries’ Quality of
Care, 23 HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVES W4-184, w4-192 (2004);
Janet Currie & W. Bentley MacLeod, First Do No Harm? Tort
Reform and Birth Outcomes, 123 Q. J. ECON. 819, 826 (2008)
(finding that replacing the traditional rule of joint and several
liability with proportional-share liability for all defendants reduced
complications of labor and cesarean deliveries, but that the
introduction of noneconomic damages caps increased the rate of
cesarean deliveries); David Dranove & Yasutora Watanabe,
Influence and Deterrence: How Obstetricians Respond to Litigation
against Themselves and Their Colleagues, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
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Interestingly, at least one research team found a relationship
between cesareans and malpractice concerns, but wondered
whether it reflected improved practice in response to higher
malpractice risk.172 A climate of greater malpractice risk was
associated with increased use of electronic fetal monitoring, more
diagnoses of fetal distress, and more consequent use of cesarean
deliveries.173
2. Studies and Their Findings: Cardiac and Other Medical
Procedures

In examining other medical procedures, a convoluted picture
emerges. Some studies have found evidence that wasteful
spending ordered by doctors is at least somewhat correlated with
the level of malpractice risk faced by those doctors. The earliest
of these studies, one that sets the high-water mark for findings of
a defensive-medicine effect, was conducted by Kessler and
McClellan and published in 1996.174 They looked at the effects of
state malpractice-law reforms on Medicare spending for hospital
patients who were treated for acute myocardial infarction (AMI)
or new ischemic heart disease (IHD) in 1984, 1987 and 1990.175
They found that what they termed “direct” tort reforms (damages
caps, abolition of punitive damages, elimination of mandatory
pre-judgment interest, changes in the collateral source rule176)
69, 92 (2010) (using micro-data, and finding a short-term, hospitalwide increase in cesarean rates in response to malpractice suits
against them or their colleagues, and an upsurge in the use of
cesareans by the responsible physician, but that these effects
disappeared in a short time); Frakes, supra note 105, at 473–77
(finding that a noneconomic damage cap was associated with a
reduction in the utilization of episiotomies during vaginal
deliveries); Beomsoo Kim, The Impact of Malpractice Risk on the
Use of Obstetrics Procedures, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S79, S79 (2007)
(finding that cesarean rates tend not to be sensitive to malpractice
risk).
172. A. Dale Tussing & Martha A. Wojtowycz, Malpractice, Defensive
Medicine, and Obstetric Behavior, 35 MED. CARE 172, 178 (1997).
173. Id.
174. Daniel P. Kessler & Mark McClellan, Do Doctors Practice
Defensive Medicine?, 111 Q. J. ECON. 353, 388 (1996) [hereinafter
Kessler & McClellan—1996].
175. Id. at 354.
176. These changes allow juries to learn whether the injured patient has
other insurance sources to cover their losses. See 50 State Collateral
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were associated with a 5% to 9% annual reduction in medical
expenditures for patients with those two conditions.177 And those
reductions occurred “without substantial effects on mortality” or
greater need for readmission for AMI or IHD—suggesting that
the additional care being delivered was of little benefit to patients
and could safely be omitted.178 “Indirect” reforms combined
(including such changes as limitations on plaintiff attorney
contingency fees, mandatory periodic payments, joint and several
liability and patient compensation funds) reduced Medicare
payments by 1.8%.179 The elimination of joint and several liability
and replacing it with a proportionate share liability rule resulted
in a small increase in Medicare spending.180 If their results could
be generalized to all health care costs, not just treatment of two
heart conditions for Medicare inpatients, then defensive medicine
could account for a substantial amount of wasteful healthcare
spending.
Later studies built on, expanded, and improved Kessler and
McClellan’s initial work in various respects, among them:
(1)including more illness conditions (as opposed to focusing on
just two types of heart disease);181 (2) examining outpatient
spending as well as inpatient spending;182 (3) analyzing physician
spending as well as hospital spending;183 (4) studying private
spending as well as Medicare spending;184 (5) covering longer time

Source Overview, THE HARMONIE GROUP https://www.harmonie
.org/file/Litigation%20Best%20Practices/Collateral%20Source
%20Rule%202016.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UH6-BTE9] (last visited
Nov. 22, 2019).
177. Kessler & McClellan—1996, supra note 185, at 386.
178. Id. at 382–83.
179. Id. at 385.
180. Id. at 372, 377.
181. See, e.g., Baiker & Chandra, infra note 40, at 841; Sloan & Shadle,
supra note 4; J. William Thomas et al., infra note 200, at 1581;
Nelson III et al., supra note 168, at 477–79.
182. See, e.g., Thomas et al., infra note 200, at 1579.
183. ALI MOGHTADERI ET AL., DAMAGE CAPS AND DEFENSIVE MEDICINE:
REEXAMINATION WITH PATIENT LEVEL DATA (Oct. 2017);
Lakdawalla & Seabury, infra note 205, at 362–367.
184. E.g., Letter to Senator Hatch, infra note 195, at 4–5.
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periods;185 (6) using larger samples;186 and (7) trying to control for
additional confounding variables.187
One of the later studies was a follow-up by Kessler and
McClellan themselves. They looked at the population of Medicare
beneficiaries with heart disease in 1984 through 1994.188 They
found that noneconomic-damage caps were associated with a
4.2% decrease in spending for AMI patients and a 4.4% decrease
in spending for IHD patients189 (contrasting with 5.8% and 8.9%,
respectively, from the initial study).190 Moreover, the follow-up
found that managed care stanched the excess spending as well as
tort reform did.191
A 2003 study by researchers at the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) studied Medicare patients treated for a broad range
of conditions, but “failed to find any impact of state tort laws on
medical spending.”192 A 2006 CBO study, looking at a broader set
of spending measures from 1980 through 2003 (and employing
more statistical controls), found that caps on noneconomic
damages resulted in no reduction in overall health care spending,
but did reduce Medicare inpatient spending.193 The study also
found that the replacement of joint and several liability with
proportionate share allocation of liability resulted in a 4%
increase in overall Medicare spending.194 The CBO’s conclusion
185. Daniel P. Kessler & Mark McClellan, Malpractice Law and Health
Care Reform: Optimal Liability Policy in an Era of Managed Care,
84 J. PUB. ECON. 175, 184 (2002) [hereinafter Kessler &
McClellan—2002]; Letter to Senator Hatch, infra note 195, at 5;
See, e.g., Thomas et al., infra note 200, at 1579.
186. See, e.g., Letter to Senator Hatch, infra note 195.
187. Kessler & McClellan—2002, supra note 185, at 182; See, e.g.,
Thomas et al., infra note 200, at 1580.
188. Kessler & McClellan—2002, supra note 185, at 175.
189. Id. at 189.
190. Kessler & McClellan—1996, supra note 174, at 382.
191. Kessler & McClellan—2002, supra note 185, at 194.
192. CONG. BUDGET OFF., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., GAO-03-836,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: IMPLICATIONS OF RISING PREMIUMS ON
ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE, at 29 (2003).
193. CONG. BUDGET OFF., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TORT LIMITS
HEALTH CARE SPENDING, at 34 (2006).

AND

194. Id. at 23. This finding should not be too surprising. Under the
traditional rule, hospital liability insurers often covered the costs
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was that the evidence was weak or inconclusive that tort reform
could reduce defensive medicine.195
Similarly, Baicker and Chandra found little evidence of
changes in treatment patterns for several different treatment
protocols for Medicare enrollees or overall expenses in Medicare
programs associated with increases in liability insurance
premiums.196 The following year, Baicker and other colleagues
found that “higher malpractice awards and premiums are
associated with higher Medicare spending, especially for imaging
services,” but those increases represented less than 0.6% of
aggregate spending.197
Sloan and Shadle extended Kessler and McClellan’s approach
by looking at Medicare payments over a longer time period (1985–
2000), expanding the range of health conditions beyond heart
disease, collecting data on treatment settings that included
outpatients as well as inpatients, and implementing additional
controls (notably the health status of the patient).198 They found
no statistically significant reduction in healthcare payments,

of all defendants, or all damages were assessed against the physician
defendant who was judged to be principally responsible for the
harm. Under the reform, however, plaintiffs are compelled to name
more defendants and to seek judgments against all of them in order
to recover the full amount of damages that the court found the
injured patient to be entitled to. Any defensive strategies that were
being undertaken would, if anything, increase. Id.
195. Id. at 35. Later, the director of OMB, Douglas W. Elmendorf,
responded to a query in a Letter to Senator Orrin G. Hatch
(Congressional Budget Office, Oct. 9, 2009, archived at
http://perma.cc/P7KS-SQE8 [hereinafter Letter to Senator
Hatch]), explaining that their data suggested that a package of tort
reforms including a $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages;
$500,000 cap on punitive damages; modification of the collateral
source rule; shortening of the statute of limitations; and
replacement of joint and several liability with a proportionate share
allocation rule–would reduce total national health care spending
attributable to utilization of services (by inference, attributable to
defensive medicine) by about 0.3%–equal at that time to about $5.4
billion per year. See id.
196. Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, The Effect of Malpractice
Liability on the Delivery of Health Care, 8 FORUM FOR HEALTH
ECON. & POL’Y: FRONTIERS IN HEALTH POL’Y RES. 4, 18 (2006).
197. Katherine Baicker et al., supra note 158, at 841.
198. Sloan & Shadle, supra note 4, at 484.
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concluding that Kessler and McClellan’s findings “do not
generalize to other reasons for hospital admission,” and that “it
seems inappropriate to conclude that tort reforms implemented
to date succeed in reducing non-beneficial care.”199
Thomas et al. studied 35 clinical specialties to assess whether
and how much malpractice liability reforms would reduce
healthcare spending. They concluded that “defensive medicine
practices exist and are widespread, but their impact on medical
care costs is small.”200 Further, they established that, across all
35 specialties, “if medical malpractice premiums were to be
reduced as much as 30 percent, defensive medicine costs would
decline no more than 0.4 percent.”201 Nelson III et al. conducted
a study focusing almost exclusively on the impact of damage caps
and concluded that “it is not clear that . . . damages caps will
significantly reduce health care costs or that any savings will be
passed on to consumers.”202 Ronen Avraham and colleagues found
a three-to-five-percent reduction in intensive cardiac
interventions following adoption of familiar tort reforms
(including damages caps), and estimated a total reduction of
about 1–2% across the entire healthcare system.203 Like Kessler
and McClellan found in 2002, Avraham and colleagues found that
managed care could eliminate the excess spending caused by
defensive practices.204
Lakdawalla and Seabury used jury awards in malpractice
cases as the measure of litigation pressure and found that where
trial awards were higher medical expenditures were higher,
presumably from defensive practices.205 The difficulty with such
an approach is that jury awards tend to rise as tort reforms make
the bringing of a claim costlier and riskier for plaintiffs’
199. Id. at 490.
200. J. William Thomas et al., Low Costs of Defensive Medicine, Small
Savings from Tort Reform, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1578, 1582–83 (2010).
201. Id. at 1583–84.
202. Nelson III et al., supra note 168, at 448.
203. Ronen Avraham et al., The Impact of Tort Reform on EmployerSponsored Health Insurance Premiums, 28 J. OF L., ECON. & ORG.
657, 661, 674, 684 (2012).
204. Id. at 658, 676.
205. Darius N. Lakdawalla & Seth A. Seabury, The Welfare Effects of
Malpractice Liability, 32 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 356, 365 (2012).
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attorneys.206 Consequently, in a world of tort reform, rising jury
awards might, paradoxically, indicate a litigation environment
that is becoming more—not less—favorable to defendants.
Paik and colleagues studied how Medicare spending changed
after Texas adopted comprehensive tort reform in 2003, including
a strict damages cap, by comparing spending in Texas counties
with high claim rates to spending in counties with low claim
rates.207 The study found no decline in spending in the highlitigation-risk counties compared to the low-risk counties.208
Compared to national spending trends, if anything, spending in
Texas increased post-reform. “In sum,” the study concluded, “we
find no evidence that Texas’s tort reforms bent the cost curve
downward.”209
In an expanded study, Paik and colleagues re-analyzed the
effects of tort reforms, particularly damages caps, of the mid1980s and found no change in Medicare spending as a
consequence.210 They also analyzed the effects of the imposition
of caps in nine states during the “third wave” of tort reforms
(2002–2005). They found no significant impact on Medicare Part
A (hospital) spending, but did find an approximately 4% increase
in Medicare Part B (physician services) spending (rather than the
predicted reduction in spending when liability fears are
reduced).211 Another study, by Moghtaderi et al., found little to
no association between the existence of caps and Part A and B
Medicare spending nor between caps and a range of cardiac
testing rates and interventions.212

206. Plaintiffs’ attorneys screen out cases involving weaker evidence and
smaller expected settlement or award amounts. See generally
Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior
of the Tort Litigation System – And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
1147 (1992).
207. Myungho Paik et al., Will Tort Reform Bend the Cost Curve?
Evidence from Texas, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 173, 173 (2012).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Myungho Paik et al., Damage Caps and Defensive Medicine,
Revisited, 51 J. HEALTH ECON. 84, 84 (2017) [hereinafter Paik et
al.—Damage Caps].
211. Id.
212. MOGHTADERI ET AL., supra note 183.
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Most worrisome, of course, is the possibility that reducing or
removing the risk of tort liability reduces safety for patients. Of
the studies that tested for that outcome, most found no effect,
but a few reached findings that could raise concerns. Reviewing
research that examined mortality as a function of tort law reforms
in 2009, the CBO found evidence that malpractice law reforms
led to a small increase in the nation’s overall death and injury
rate—translating, at the time, to approximately 5,000 additional
deaths and 400,000 more injuries.213 Similarly, Lakdawalla and
Seabury found that defensive practices were beneficial to patients
and therefore that tort reforms aimed at reducing physician
liability expenses were not cost-effective.214 Currie and McLeod
found that the introduction of noneconomic damages caps
actually increased the rate of cesareans—one intuitively expects
them to decrease—as well as increased preventable complications
of labor.215 More recently, Zabinski and Black found that imposing
caps on general damage awards triggered gradually rising rates of
harmful errors, which are measured using the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality’s (AHRQ) Patient Safety
Indicators instrument.216

213. Letter to Senator Hatch, supra note 195.
214. Lakdawalla & Seabury, supra note 205, at 368.
215. Currie & Bentley MacLeod, supra note 171, at 826.
216. Zenon Zabinski & Bernard S. Black, The Deterrent Effect of Tort
Law: Evidence from Medical Malpractice Reform, RESEARCH
PAPER NO. 13-09, NW. UNIV. L. & ECON. (Feb. 15, 2015), available
at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2161362 [https://perma.cc/
UZ3T-W7PU]. The study looked at the effect on patient safety of
adopting caps (limiting general damage awards) in five states
(Florida, Georgia, Illinois, South Carolina, and Texas), which were
also compared to control states that did not adopt the caps reform,
thereby allowing trends due to other factors to be taken into
consideration. As a measure of safety practices, the researchers used
the PSI (Patient Safety Indicators instrument), developed by the
AHRQ. The research found that in states with caps on damages,
the level of safety as measured by the PSI declined. “We find a
gradual rise in rates [of errors and harm] for most PSIs after reform,
consistent with a gradual relaxation of care, or failure to reinforce
care standards over time. The decline is widespread and applies
both to aspects of care that are relatively likely to lead to a
malpractice suit (e.g., PSI-5; foreign body left in during surgery),
and aspects that are unlikely to do so (e.g., PSI-7; central-line
associated bloodstream infection). The broad relaxation of care
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In all, the multivariate studies present quite a mixed picture,
even in regard to the fundamental question of whether defensive
medicine exists. And, if it does, in regard to what health
conditions, to what extent, and at what cost it exists. The bestinformed conclusion would have to be: more research is needed to
establish sound answers to these questions.217
3. One “Almost Quasi-Experiment”

Frakes and Gruber recently reported an important study that
improves upon the multivariate approach, approximating some of
the qualities of a randomized experiment.218 They designed their
study around an idiosyncrasy of the U.S. military health services
(MHS) in its prohibition on suing for medical negligence.219 Under
the Feres doctrine, active-duty personnel who believe that they
have been injured through negligent care have no right to sue for
compensation.220 This is in stark contrast to other patients at
military hospitals—dependents, retirees, and other family
members—whose malpractice claims face no such bar.
In essence, from one patient to the next, the very same
military treatment facilities (MTFs) and their staff face two
different worlds: one with and one without the possibility of
malpractice liability. It’s almost a true experiment. But because
patients in the two groups differ in ways that likely confound
observed differences, and because other mechanisms might be
responsible for observed differences, the researchers also used
multivariate analyses to try to statistically remove possible

suggests that medical malpractice liability provides ‘general
deterrence’—an incentive to be careful in general . . . .” Id.
217. See also Michael Frakes & Jonathan Gruber, Defensive Medicine:
Evidence from Military Immunity, 11 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y
197 (2019) (summing up the same body of multivariate studies by
saying that, “[c]ollectively, the . . . findings paint a varied picture
of both the size and existence of defensive medicine.”).
218. Id. For a design that many researchers would characterize as a
quasi-experiment, see Saks—Scientific Method, supra note 140, at
§ 4:43.
219. See generally Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 159 (1950)
(concluding that the United States “is not liable under the Federal
Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise
out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.”).
220. Id.
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confounding.221 Still, their approach comes closer than any other
to being an apples-to-apples comparison. If providers at MTFs
order more tests for their patients who possess the right to sue
than they do for patients who have no right to sue, all else equal,
then those differences likely result from defensive practices rather
than something else. In addition, another basis for comparison
arose when some military base hospitals closed and military
patients had to turn to non-military hospitals for care.222
Here, we summarize Frakes and Gruber’s main findings. On
several different measures of treatment intensity, patients at onbase MTFs who could not sue received four-to-five percent less
care than those who could sue.223 Where doctors had less
discretion whether to treat or not, that effect of liability immunity
was reduced by one-to-two percent.224 In regard to patients for
whom doctors were not immune from suit, the higher intensity of
care was far more likely to consist of diagnostic procedures rather
than non-diagnostic procedures.225 All but two non-diagnostic
procedures showed no differences in frequency in the care of
patients who were, versus who were not, able to sue.226 Those
two—gastrointestinal and orthopedic admissions (which were
only marginally statistically significant)—suggested that
providers were less likely to order those procedures for patients
who had the power to sue.227 Interestingly, all else equal, MTFs
treated patients at a lower intensity than private hospitals did.228
Frakes and Gruber’s study also permits an estimate of the
maximum savings that might be realized if the healthcare
industry were made completely immune from tort liability, which
we discuss in the concluding section.

221. See Frakes & Gruber, supra note 217, at 229.
222. Id. at 209–10.
223. Id. at 204, 220.
224. Id. at 220.
225. Id. at 221.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 216. Perhaps this reflects the “restraining hand” of managed
care.
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Discussion
The notion of defensive medicine presents a series of
paradoxes. The most aggressive advocates on behalf of the
healthcare industry insist that healthcare workers routinely
behave unethically, by lying to patients and insurers; recklessly,
by subjecting patients to needless tests and treatments;
wastefully and fraudulently, by redistributing wealth from
patients, insurers, and taxpayers to themselves by ordering
inappropriate procedures. They insist, however, that potential
remedies should not be focused on the actors who engage in such
behavior because their actions are motivated by fear—a fear of
being compelled by the law to reimburse patients for losses
resulting from preventable iatrogenic harms. Instead, healthcare
advocates argue that the solution is to remove the source of the
fear by further insulating the healthcare industry from legal
accountability. Doing so, they promise, will make the evils of
defensive medicine and the wasteful spending that results from it
disappear.
By contrast, those who would continue to apply conventional
accident law to the healthcare industry do not seem to believe
that healthcare providers behave as badly as the industry claims.
Paradoxically, the industry’s argument implies a legal system
that has a powerful influence on behavior. By the lights of the
defensive medicine concept, physicians and other providers are
being over-deterred by the tort system. Their solution is to
insulate the healthcare industry from accident law. One might
think, instead, that with helpful data and thoughtful
adjustments, a legal tool so able to move behavior should be able
to be employed to steer providers to deliver better and safer
healthcare. Doing so could render litigation less necessary, reduce
provider fears, make defensive practices unnecessary, and send
wasteful healthcare expenditures downward.
Another paradox arises from the fact that, if providers are
caught ordering unnecessary tests, treatments, and other
procedures, thereby fraudulently increasing their incomes, they
are charged with healthcare fraud and are required to return their
ill-gotten gain; they might also be confronted with civil penalties,
if not criminal charges.229 But if they engage in essentially the
same behavior under the flag of “defensive medicine,” then the
229. See, e.g., GAO-12-820, supra note 78.
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typical response is sympathetic concern for the fearful physician.
In both scenarios, healthcare providers elevated their own
interests above those of their patients and profited from doing so.
But what at one moment evokes scorn for fraud and self-dealing
is transformed in the blink of an eye into a cry for help.
One of the most remarkable facts about defensive medicine is
how successful the promotors of the notion have been in
persuading legislators and the public of its existence, its
seriousness, that it is key to solving the problem of exorbitant
healthcare costs,230 and that the only cure for it worth discussing
is to reduce the healthcare industry’s accountability. That,
despite empirical evidence for the hypothesis which has been
found contradictory and uncertain. Indeed, Paik and colleagues
concluded that, although a “core policy argument used to support
adoption of damage caps . . . is that caps will reduce defensive
medicine and thus reduce healthcare spending,” their research
found that caps led to higher spending.231
Proponents of the defensive medicine hypothesis have put
forward fantastic numbers, the most extreme of them
approaching a trillion dollars annually, on air-thin bases. Even
serious and sober studies have found their way to numbers at the
high end of where the empirical evidence can take us. In their
effort to calculate the total national cost of the medical liability
system in the United States—from administrative costs to
damages payments and everything in between—Mello et al.
arrived at a figure of $45.6 billion (in 2008 dollars) for defensive
medical practices ($38.8 billion by hospitals and $6.8 billion by
physicians) and $10 billion for all other malpractice litigation
system costs added together.232 Obviously, that is vastly less than
230. President Barack Obama seems to have been at least somewhat
persuaded: “I don’t believe malpractice reform is a silver bullet, but
I have talked to enough doctors to know that defensive medicine
may be contributing to unnecessary costs.” Barack Obama,
President of the United States, Speech to a Joint Session of
Congress on Health Care Reform (Sept. 9, 2009), text available at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarkspresident-barack-obama-address-joint-session-congress
[https://
perma.cc/9BWY-EY8K].
231. Paik et al.—Damage Caps, supra note 210, at 96.
232. Michelle M. Mello et al., National Costs of the Medical Liability
System, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1569 (2010) [hereinafter Mello et al.—
Costs].
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the survey-based guestimates of $650 to $850 billion (as much as
$933 billion in today’s dollars233). But Mello et al. built their
estimate of the defensive medicine components on Kessler and
McClellan’s high-water-mark finding.234 Had Mello et al. averaged
in the other studies, some of which found more modest fear-oflitigation effects and others none at all, their estimate of costs
attributable to defensive medicine would have been lower still.235
Mello et al. do note that the quality of the sources for their
estimate of defensive medicine costs was unavoidably one of the
weakest of all cost components in their study, and classify the
quality of that evidence as “low.”236 Indeed, the shaky quality of
the underlying evidence might be the most important lesson to
take from our entire exploration of the hypothesis of defensive
medicine.
So much for costs. What about benefits? Mello and colleagues
recognized that from the cost of defensive practices one has to
subtract the benefits secured by malpractice litigation. The most
notable of these would be savings from injuries and deaths
prevented. If that benefit exceeds the cost of defensive medicine,
then the system provides a net gain to society. On this vital
matter, Mello et al. write: “It is important to note, however, that
our calculations ignored benefits arising from this spending.”237
This is because the benefit figure is a known unknown. From a
dollars-and-cents perspective, it does policy-makers little good to
know the costs of any system or policy unless the benefits that
those costs purchase for society are also known. And so, another
curiosity of this debate has been its obsession with costs
accompanied by a disregard of benefits.238
233. Inflation Calculator, CPO INFLATION CALCULATOR, http://www.
in2013dollars.com [http://perma.cc/ 3BPB-T85S] (last visited Feb.
21, 2020).
234. Michael D. Frakes, The Surprising Relevance of Medical
Malpractice Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 358 n. 79 (2015) (“Mello
and her coauthors relied heavily on Kessler and McClellan, whose
findings generally fall on the very high end of those studies that
have found a positive association between liability forces and
health-care costs.”).
235. Id.
236. Mello et al.—Costs, supra note 232, at 1574.
237. Mello et al.—Costs, supra note 232.
238. One recent study that offers a peek at the benefit side of the
equation is Zabinski & Black, supra note 216, at 2 (finding that the
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Perhaps the chief concern of policy-makers is how to bring
down America’s astonishingly high healthcare costs. To the
extent that defensive medicine exists, how much can reducing or
eliminating it contribute to bending the cost curve downward?
Looking across the landscape of policy options for bringing
healthcare costs under control, while ensuring broad access to
care and promoting innovation, Mongan et al. in the New
England Journal of Medicine, rated malpractice reforms as having
the “lowest potential for cost savings” because the “direct costs
of malpractice premiums” combined with the “estimated costs of
‘defensive medicine’ are not major factors in overall health care
spending.”239 More recently, Frakes summed up the research
community’s consensus as being “that medical malpractice reform
is unlikely to be a meaningful source of health-care cost
containment.”240
Frakes and Gruber have provided the approximate upper
bound of savings that might accrue from reduced defensive
practices if malpractice liability were abolished entirely, that
amount being under five percent.241 The costs that would be
adoption of caps, the most popular reform, seems to initiate a
decline in patient safety measured by AHRQ’s PSI (Patient Safety
Indicators)).
239. James J. Mongan et al., Options for Slowing the Growth of Health
Care Costs, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1509, 1512 (2008).
240. Frakes, supra note 105, at 317; See Thomas et al., supra note 200,
at 1583 (concluding that “defensive medicine practices exist and
are widespread, but their impact on medical care costs is small.”);
Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical
Errors: Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L.
REV. 1595, 1629 (2002) (commenting that defensive medicine “has
long been invoked by chronic defendants . . . as a rationale for
enacting tort reform. However, the over deterrence rhetoric has not
been firmly grounded in fact. Most defensive-medicine studies have
failed to demonstrate any real impacts on medical practice arising
from higher malpractice premiums.”).
241. Margot Sanger-Katz, A Fear of Lawsuits Really Does Seem to
Result in Extra Medical Tests, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/23/upshot/malpracticelawsuits-medical-costs.html [https://perma.cc/Z9RN-3SUQ] (“Mr.
Gruber said the paper’s estimates were best viewed as a kind of
ceiling for the effects of more realistic reforms . . . Any law that
limits the cases where patients can sue, or the amount of money
they can collect, is likely to lower medical use in the hospital by
less than the 5 percent they measured in their study.”).
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associated with abolition, including a rising incidence of
iatrogenic injury, are unspecified. Thus, whether abolition would
lead to net savings or net increased costs is unknown.
If excessive healthcare costs are the principal concern (as it
appears to be even among proponents of tort reform in the name
of reducing defensive medicine), then we might expect the
conversation to be about larger sources of wasteful expenditures
in healthcare. Using Mello et al.’s estimate of the cost of defensive
medicine, the portion of total healthcare spending attributable to
defensive practices, is one-and-a-half percent.242 But that
represents only a fraction of the approximately 20–30 percent of
total healthcare expenditures that are squandered on low-value
and no-value services.243 If the major concern is reducing
healthcare costs by reducing wasteful spending, then attention
might more fruitfully be given to the problems that account for
more than ninety percent of the waste, and less on what accounts
for only five-to-seven percent of the waste. The laser-beam focus
on defensive medical practices suggests that the industry’s true
interests are not in bending the cost curve.
If defensive medicine is itself a particular concern, whatever
the reasons, then attention could be given to reducing it more
effectively:
[i]f tort reformers were genuinely worried about defensive
medicine and desired to prevent it, they would offer vastly
different proposals from the ones they now endorse.
Concern about unnecessary tests and procedures, for
example, might lead them to call for evidence-based

242. See Mello et al.—Costs, supra note 232, at 1574. Mello et al.’s 2008
total of $45.6 billion of defensive medicine converts to $51.9 billion
in 2017 dollars. Dividing that by total national spending on
healthcare in 2017 ($3.5 trillion) yields a 1.5% increase.
243. See JONATHAN SKINNER & ELLIOTT S. FISHER, DARTMOUTH INST.
FOR HEALTH POL’Y & CLINICAL PRAC. REFLECTIONS ON
GEOGRAPHIC VARIATIONS IN U.S. HEALTH CARE, at iii (Mar 31,
2010), available at https://www.dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/
press/Skinner_Fisher_DA_05_10.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8CZKMV2B] (finding that, if all regions of the U.S. could safely reduce
care to the level observed in low spending regions with equal
quality, healthcare cost savings of twenty to thirty percent could
be achieved, but concluding that that is an underestimate because
even the low-cost regions employ some wasteful practices that could
be safely eliminated).
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treatment guidelines specifying when and if certain tests
need to be performed.244

As research described above has suggested, managed care can
be as effective as tort reform in reducing defensive practices.
Insurers could identify worthless practices and refuse to pay for
them. Prosecutors could expand enforcement of healthcare fraud
to include the most common defensive practices. Accountable
care organizations (which are on the rise), or other forms of valuebased payment arrangements might, by their very nature, drive
down defensive practices along with other low-value care.245
One of the most illuminating findings is that tort reforms
have little impact on the perceptions of healthcare providers
about the legal environment that they inhabit. If providers are
insensitive to the specific tort rules under which they practice, if
they do not know what the law is in their jurisdiction, then they
cannot sensibly adjust their estimation of malpractice risk.
Instead, they simply have and hold onto a generalized fear of
becoming a defendant in litigation. To the extent that describes
providers’ state of knowledge, it means that the economic and
psychological signals that are sent by any one (or package) of tort
reforms tends to be overwhelmed by noise.
That is what Carrier and her colleagues found: levels of
malpractice concern that were generally high and unrelated to the
actual level of lawsuit risk in the state where physicians
practiced.246 Similarly, Hyman and Sage observe that
“[p]hysicians in states with strong tort reforms and in states
244. Hyman & Silver—2005, supra note 39, at 942.
245. See Mark Merlis, Accountable Care Organizations (Updated),
HEALTH AFF. 1 (Aug. 13, 2010), available at https://www.
healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20100813.757461/full/ [https://
perma.cc/N3K9-ALXT]; David Muhlestein et al., Recent Progress
in The Value Journey: Growth of ACOs and Value-Based Payment
Models
in
2018,
HEALTH
AFF.
(Aug.
14,
2018),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180810.481968/
full/ [https://perma.cc/7HD4-9FR4].
246. Emily R. Carrier et al., Physicians’ Fears of Malpractice Lawsuits
are not Assuaged by Tort Reforms, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1585, 1589
(2010) (“We found high levels of malpractice concern among both
generalists and specialists in states where objective measures of
malpractice risk were low. We also found relatively modest
differences in physicians’ concerns across states with and without
common tort reforms.”).

80

Health Matrix·Volume 30·2020
The Paradoxes of Defensive Medicine

lacking those reforms articulated identical views regarding
malpractice risk.”247 Thus, according to Carrier et al., it is possible
that “many policies aimed at controlling malpractice costs may
have a limited effect on physicians’ malpractice concerns”—and
therefore on practice behavior and costs.248
Relatedly, Hyman and Sage have discussed the “habits and
beliefs” of physicians, which “seem unaffected by evidence
regarding the actual likelihood of a lawsuit or the level of
potential damages.”249 This is consistent with findings of
physicians’ overestimation of lawsuit risk250 and general “anxiety
about medical malpractice litigation and liability,” which has
been described as “pervasive . . . erroneous . . . and
irrational . . . .”251 The insensitivity of healthcare providers to
actual levels of litigation risk has led Scherz and Oliver to suggest
that “[t]he only way to eliminate defensive medicine is to make it
impossible for doctors to be sued for medical errors.”252

247. David A. Hyman & William Sage, Do Health Reform and
Malpractice Reform Fit Together?, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. PUB.
POL’Y RES., Working Paper No. 2011-02 (April 1, 2011), available
at
https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/2011-04Hyman-Sage.pdf [https://perma.cc/XQ3P-CFGL].
248. Carrier et al. propose several possible explanations for their finding
that doctors are insensitive to something that they are thought to
be quite concerned about. The most paradoxical of them is the
possibility that reform advocates have them confused: “Advocacy
efforts by medical professional societies in support of tort reform
may contribute to this problem by conveying the impression that
most or all states and specialties are in crisis and require additional
legal protection.” Carrier et al., supra note 246, at 1591.If so, it is
the extreme and undifferentiated complaining of their supplicants
that has created a situation that prevents reforms from being able
to change the very thing (wasteful spending) that supposedly
prompts the supplication.
249. Hyman & Sage, supra note 247, at 20.
250. Lawthers, supra note 50, at 468.
251. Marshall B. Kapp, Medical Error Versus Malpractice, 1 DEPAUL
J. HEALTH CARE L. 751, 752 (1997).
252. Hal Scherz & Wayne Oliver, Defensive Medicine: A Cure Worse
Than the Disease, FORBES (Aug. 27, 2013), https://www.forbes
.com/sites/realspin/2013/08/27/defensive-medicine-a-cure-worsethan-the-disease/#66652b27c954
[https://perma.cc/VK8M7XSK].
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Another scenario aligns well with existing empirical evidence,
and is consistent with an image of healthcare providers as
thoughtful professionals who are properly concerned about their
patients’ well-being, rather than routinely sacrificing their
patients’ interests for their own.253 This scenario is that sick
patients fall along a continuum ranging from clearly suffering
from a condition that requires a particular treatment strategy, at
one extreme, to clearly not suffering from the condition at the
other extreme. For those clear cases, no defensive practices need
be employed. Cases near the middle, characterized by the greatest
uncertainty and high risk of error, will be more likely to prompt
“defensive” behavior, especially for a condition where an
erroneous diagnosis could lead to a disastrous outcome. Under
such circumstances, non-cost-beneficially-optimal, “wasteful,”
diagnostic testing is most likely to be undertaken.254 Whether that
is done to protect the physician or the patient might be impossible
to disentangle. Doctors might say that they thought they were
acting defensively. But they were simultaneously making sure
that the patient was being protected against the consequences of
error. Under such circumstances, the line that divides defensive
medicine from good medical practice becomes impossible to
discern.
An example of that kind of situation would be a head injury.
If the patient suffered a potentially dangerous head injury that
could have been detected with more testing and observation, but
is not caught, the result for the patient could be devastating.
That’s what the doctors responding to OTA’s head-injury-case
scenario were almost certainly thinking about when they
proposed to order “excessive” testing. That is certainly what Atul
Gawande was worrying about when his son was taken to the ER
after a fall. Furthermore, it is consistent with research finding
that “the strongest effect of greater malpractice pressure is in
increased use of imaging services, with somewhat smaller effects
on the use of other discretionary, generally low-risk services such

253. Rather than the image promoted by healthcare industry lobbyists
of frightened providers who impose expense on their patients and
place them at risk, eagerly violating laws and ethical principles,
merely to reduce the chances the provider will face the annoyance
of a lawsuit.
254. See Frakes, supra note 105, at 359.
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as physician visits and consultations, use of diagnostic tests, and
minor procedures.”255
If that is what most “defensive medicine” looks like, then it
is not irrational, not particularly wasteful, and not something
many patients would wish to put a stop to. Perhaps most, if not
all, defensive medicine stands at the confluence of two streams—
defensive practice and good medical practice—flowing together
and becoming one, indistinguishable.
Moreover, if that is the most accurate picture of defensive
medical practice, then the basis for most of the malpractice law
reform that has taken place over the past several decades
evaporates.

255. Baicker & Chandra—Disappearing Doctors, supra note 40, at 31;
See also Frakes & Gruber, supra note 217, at 221; OTA-H-602,
supra note 66 (stating, among other things, that “defensive
medicine is not always bad for patients . . . a high percentage of
defensive medical procedures are ordered to minimize the risk of
being wrong when the medical consequences of being wrong are
severe.”).

83

